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A noticeable exception to the recent expansion in manufacturers'
tort liability has been in the area of obviously dangerous products. Many
courts, seemingly blinded by the fact that an obvious dangcr should be
apparent to all, have denied consumers recoveries. Some simply have
found that a manufacturer has no duty to safeguard against patent perils,
others have found obviousness instrumental in limiting the extent of that
duty and still others have found obviousness helpful in sustaining a suc-
cessful affirmative defense. Professor M3arschdall contends that these courts
have neglected a fundamental objective of tort law--fairness between the
parties. lit this artckle, she examines the various theories which might sup-
port a consumer's recovery and the manner in which these principles have
been applied in the obvious-danger context. Site points out ways in which
greater protection for consumers can be achieved within the framcwork of
existing tort theory. Her basic argument, however, is for a form of ab-
solute liability for manufacturers of patently dangerous products as the
proper standard to ensure fairness.
INTRODUCTION
G REAT progress has been made toward expanding the con-
sumer's right to recover for personal injuries caused by
defectively designed products. However, since this trend has re-
quired the revamping of several traditional legal doctrines, the
movement toward reform has been somewhat diffused. Predict-
ably, but unfortunately, attempted innovations have not pro-
duced coordination among theories. As a consequence, gaps have
appeared, leaving significant areas where buyers remain unpro-
tected. One area in need of attention involves products whose
dangerous design is obvious. Through an analysis of the doctrines
* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1065
affecting recovery for injuries caused by such products, this arti-
cle will indicate not only the inadequacies and confusion in cur-
rent negligence and warranty law, but also the extent to which
outmoded negligence concepts muddy the waters of strict liability
in tort. It will explore the probable reasons for these gaps in
consumer protection and suggest possible methods for closing
them.
Under present law, a person injured by using a dangerous
product may sue the manufacturer for damages on one or more
of the following four theories: (1) he may allege that the manu-
facturer was negligent in failing to warn of the danger involved
in using the product; (2) he may claim that the manufacturer
was negligent in the design or construction of a product which
exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury; (3) he may
argue that the manufacturer should be held strictly liable in tort
for injuries resulting from the use of his product; or (4) he may
assert that the manufacturer has breached an implied warranty
of merchantability because the danger rendered the product unfit
for the ordinary purposes for which it was intended.
The manufacturer has been left with ample opportunity to
avoid liability. If the danger of injury arises from a defect in de-
sign, rather than in construction, and the danger inherent in the
design is apparent, the plaintiff's chances of recovery under any
of these theories may be severely restricted or wholly eliminated.
On the one hand, the manufacturer may be absolved from a duty
to warn or to make the product less dangerous, precisely because
the risk of injury is obvious. On the other band, because of his
use of a patently dangerous product, the plaintiff may be held to
have assumed the risk of injury, to have negligently contributed
to his own injury or to have inserted an intervening cause which
makes his own action, rather than that of the manufacturer, the
proximate cause of the injury. As will be seen, the role and the
weight assigned to the factor of "obviousness" in these dangerous-
design cases have varied according to the plaintiff's underlying
theory of recovery. As a result, the protection available to a con-
sumer in any given case remains uncertain.
In examining the legal problems caused by multiple theories
of liability and multiple defenses in dangerous-design cases, this
article will use an analysis derived from an article by Professor
George P. Fletcher.' Fletcher rejects the commonly held view that
the history of tort law reflects a "struggle between negligence and
fault on the one hand, and strict liability on the other."12 Instead,
1 Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972).
2 Id. at 539.
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he perceives a conflict between "two radically different paradigms
for analyzing tort liability"--the paradigm of reasonableness4
and the paradigm of reciprocity. Roughly speaking, under the
paradigm of reasonableness, tort rules are evaluated in terms of
their instrumental utility in promoting the welfare of society as
a whole.6 Under the paradigm of reciprocity, tort rules are de-
signed to promote fairness between the parties to an incident
causing injury to one or more of them.7
I agree with Fletcher that the purpose of a tort system should
be to foster fairnesss and that, for this reason, the paradigm of
reciprocity represents a preferable mode of analysis. However,
Fletcher's approach is not free from difficulty. After discussing the
paradigm of reasonableness, the next section outlines Fletcher's
theory, applies it in brief to dangerous-products cases and points
out some of the problems that Fletcher's approach engenders. The
remainder of the article reveals in detail the pitfalls of the
paradigm of reasonableness in the context of litigation involving
dangerous products. Finally, the article will note how the paradigm
of reciprocity can be used to promote fairness and will show that,
in this context, fairness requires that the party injured by an
obviously dangerous product recover in the vast majority of cases.
II
THE ANALYTICAL FRAamWoRx
A. The Paradigm of Reasonableness
1. Definition
A familiar conceptual framework for tort liability is the
paradigm of reasonableness. This paradigm centers around the
economic "reasonable man" and holds that a person who acted
reasonably will not be held liable to another he has injured.
Reasonableness is determined by a straight-forward balancing of
costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net social utility (benefit),
the victim is not entitled to recover from the risk-creator; if the
risk yields a net social disutility (cost), the victim is entitled to
recover.9
The paradigm is utilitarian both in formulation and in intended
effect. For it purports not only to determine which activities are
3 Id. at5 40.
4 Id. at 542.
5 Id. at 540.
6 Id. at 542-43.
7 Id. at 540-41.
8 Id. at 538-39.
9 Id. at 542.
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socially desirable but also to discourage those that are not, through
the imposition of penalties.1
2. A Critique
In theory, the paradigm of reasonableness is a useful tool
since a cost-benefit analysis is readily adaptable to a society's
changing concepts of properly allocated tort responsibility. As
applied to products-liability cases, however, the paradigm has
yielded unsatisfactory results. First, it has not been utilized to
take account of all the costs to society of an injury caused by an
obvious defect. More importantly, in its application, proper em-
phasis has not been placed upon what I feel to be the overriding
purpose of tort law-fairness to the injured party.
a. The Failure to Account for Societal Costs-Few would
dispute that the paradigm, as applied, has degenerated into a very
narrow cost-benefit analysis. Reasonable manufacturers are in
business to make money. Thus, when deciding whether or not a
manufacturer acted reasonably in making and marketing an ob-
viously dangerous product without a safeguard, a court weighs
only the costs of adding the safeguard against any potential
diminution in profits that will result from not adding it. Little if
any attention is paid to the social costs of an injury caused by
an obviously dangerous product. For example, if a highly skilled
workman is totally and permanently disabled by an inadequately
designed machine, society is forever deprived of his individual
skills. Even if someone can be trained to replace him, there fre-
quently will be uncompensated costs to the employer.11 Yet, as
the paradigm's utilitarian calculus has been applied in the past,
these costs are left out of the ultimate liability decision.
b. Unfairness to the Injured Party-A more important
shortcoming of this cost-benefit analysis is its failure, in far too
many cases, to compensate the injured victim. Professors Blum
and Kalven apparently consider this fact irrelevant in the case
of an obvious or well-known danger, basing their conclusion on
two assumptions.12 First, they feel that the individual consumer
can protect himself by exercising a thoughtful and free market
"vote" for either a safer and more expensive product or for a
10 See id. at 542-43.
11 Cf. W. Prosser, Torts 938 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter Prosser, Torts].
12 See W. Blum & H. Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem 58-59 (1965). In fairness, I should note that in the cited pages Blum
and Kalven are evaluating the choice of a system of tort liability from an econ-
omist's perspective. They conclude that in some cases the system chosen would have
no effect upon the society's allocation of resources. See id.
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cheaper but more dangerous product. Second, if the consumer
buys a dangerous product they assume he has the information
necessary to make a reasonable choice for or against accident
insurance.'3 The Maryland Court of Appeals adopted this ratio-
nale in an inadequately-safeguarded-lawnmower case, Myers v.
Montgomery Ward & Co.,14 stating:
[T]he absence of these safety devices was apparent at the time
of purchase, and, in a free market, Myers had the choice of buying
a mower equipped with them, of buying the mower which he did, or
of buying no mower at all.15
There are several problems with this reasoning. First, there
is no assurance that a consumer shopping for a product will al-
ways have a choice between a safe one and a dangerous one. While
well-designed lawnmowers may always be available, markets for
other, less common products may not offer safe designs. Or the
product may be unavoidably dangerous-such as a knife, or a
drug that cannot be made safe for all persons. Second, although
the absence of a safety device may be obvious, the extent of the
danger may not be appreciated by some purchasers. And obtain-
ing risk information may be either impossible or expensive for
the individual consumer since he has no easy access to accident
statistics for a particular product. Third, even if he correctly
perceives the abstract danger, for psychological reasons an indi-
vidual is likely to underestimate the risk of serious harm to him-
self.16 Fourth, even if there are both safe and unsafe designs, it
is most frequently the poor who from economic necessity will be
forced to buy the less safe product. Finally, the dangerous product
may injure bystanders who had no say in the initial decision to
purchase. In short, market choice is not always available and
market information is less than perfect. In the end, justifications
for a cost-benefit analysis which often leaves an injured consumer
uncompensated are unsatisfactory.
The unfairness that can result to an individual from the
reasonableness approach is illustrated by the following hypotheti-
cal. Suppose that a defendant manufactures a drug which pro-
duces the most effective pain relief for 3,000,000 persons suffer-
ing from severe pain. However, it is known that approximately
two persons among 1,000,000 users of the drug will suffer serious
eye damage irreversible by the time it is detected. Let us further
13 Id.
14 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 895 (1969).
15 Id. at 297, 252 A.2d at 864.
16 G. Calabmsi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 206
(1970).
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assume that the defect in the product could be remedied by an
expenditure that would make manufacture unprofitable. Assume
further that society, through the Food and Drug Administration,
has decided that it will not intervene directly to prevent manu-
facture and sale of the drug. So long as the drug is marketed with
a strong warning and with instructions for use only in cases of
severely incapacitating pain where no other drug offers significant
relief, the benefits to society are felt to outweigh the drug's
dangers.
Assume further that the risk of loss in the hypothetical is
placed on the consumer. Knowledge of the risk involved will
probably deter some consumers from buying the drug (usually
because their doctors decide not to prescribe it), resulting in a
slightly higher price for the drug. Assume, however, that enough
persons buy at the higher price to make it profitable for the
company to continue manufacturing and selling the drug. For
those who do buy and are injured, it is a bad ballgame indeed.
Their blurred vision, or even blindness, goes uncompensated, and
they are, in effect, told by the utilitarians that this is all right.
The utilitarians reason that a different allocation of loss merely
would substitute certain interrelated costs for the uncompensated
harm of injured users. Some users who want the drug.would not
be able to afford it. This would result in an even higher priced
drug which in turn places more dollar costs on those who con-
tinue to buy. To the utilitarian mind this substitution of costs is
unjustified because the risk of harm to the total consuming com-
munity is small.
The drug hypothetical underscores Fletcher's contention that
a cost-benefit analysis results in inequities to the individual who
"cannot fairly be expected to suffer ... deprivations in the name
of a utilitarian calculus. His life, bodily integrity, reputation,
privacy, liberty and property-all are interests that might claim
insulation from deprivations designed to further other interests.11
c. The Deterrence Arguments-The central thesis of the
reasonableness paradigm is that the threat of judgment liability
will deter socially undesirable activities and encourage desirable
ones. Thus, it may be argued that a manufacturer will refrain from
marketing products deemed "unreasonably" dangerous rather than
face the possibility of judgment costs. As a corollary to this argu-
ment, a manufacturer could be expected to produce safer products.
If this theoretical hypothesis were a practical reality, then the
paradigm of reasonableness might be an acceptable framework
17 Fletcher, supra note 1, at 668.
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for deciding obvious-danger cases. Unfortunately, the imposition
of liability may be neither a deterrent nor an incentive-the
threat of increased liability-insurance premiums may not affect a
manufacturer's conduct.'
Of course, it might also be argued that the utilitarian deci-
sion not to impose liability for the manufacture of an obviously
dangerous product will have an important deterrent effect on con-
sumers. It is conceivable that the absence of a consumer's remedy
for injuries from obviously dangerous products might deter care-
less use. Calabresi points out, however, that a consumer would be
as much deterred by the possibility of physical suffering as he
would be by the prospect of uncompensated suffering.10 He also
notes that careless conduct due to absentmindedness is not deterr-
able by any means since it is a fact of life that individuals
cannot control all their acts.20 In short, it seems unlikely that
the decision to shift losses caused by obviously dangerous prod-
ucts, or to leave such losses where they originally fell, will have
any meaningful effect on patterns of conduct2 1
Most cases involving dangerous products have been resolved
within the framework of the paradigm of reasonableness. Yet, as
has been demonstrated, this paradigm appears to be unsatisfac-
tory. First, I feel that it has been applied too narrowly. Many
of the societal costs of injuries caused by obviously dangerous
products have been left out of the liability decision. Second, I
feel that the paradigm fails to properly achieve the central goal
of a tort system-fairness among individual litigants. Finally, the
paradigm of reasonableness may fail to satisfy its own utilitarian
reason for being. The purpose of imposing liability in a utilitarian
system is to encourage or discourage conduct. Yet, as we have
seen, in many situations it is highly questionable whether these
utilitarian liability decisions have significant impact upon society's
conduct in the obvious-danger area.
B. The Paradigmn of Reciprocity
In order to advance general social welfare the paradigm of
reasonableness often sacrifices fairness to individual plaintiffs.
18 A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence 247 (1971). However, what
a given manufacturer would do is obviously an empirical question. It would seem
that many self-insared manufacturers might well choose to make a safer product
in order to minimize their costs.
19 Calabresi, supra note 16, at 218.
20 Id. at 109-10.
21 In fact, deterrence probably could be implemented better by direct admin-
istrative and criminal sanctions. Passage of the Consumer Product Safety Act, IS
U.S.C. §§ 2051-81 (Supp. II, 1972), is the latest step in this direction.
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The paradigm of reciprocity, by contrast, seeks to vindicate "the
community's sense of fairness" to individual litigants.2 Fairness
is achieved only if "all individuals in a society have the right to
roughly the same degree of security from risk. 28 If an individual
is forced to relinquish his security and suffers injury, he may be
entitled to compensation, which serves as "a surrogate for the
individual's right to the same security as enjoyed by others." 2
Thus, the first inquiry under the paradigm of reciprocity is
whether the individual deserves compensation. The second in-
quiry is whether the defendant should compensate.25
1. Should the Plaintiff Be Compensated?
To determine the injury victim's right to recover, one ex-
amines the nature of the risk to which he was exposed. All mem-
bers of society are constantly exposed to risks of injury resulting
from forms of behavior that are typical in their community and
their conduct in turn exposes others to danger. Fletcher terms
these risks "background risks."G2 Other forms of behavior are less
typical and more hazardous. Fletcher postulates that "a victim
has a right to recover for injuries caused by a risk greater in
degree and different in order from those created by the victim
and imposed on the defendant. 117 By contrast, if two individuals
expose each other to risks of similar order and magnitude, there
is no right to recovery. 8 In the first situation, the risks are non-
reciprocal; in the second, they are reciprocalW 9
To illustrate this distinction, Fletcher uses several hypo-
theticals. When a pilot flies an airplane, he exposes those on the
ground to a nonreciprocal risk of injury. At the same time, he
exposes other pilots in the air to a reciprocal risk of injury. If
the pilot crashes, victims on the ground may be entitled to com-
pensation. If there is a collision with another plane, neither pilot
will normally recover. 0 In the first case, the risk is nonreciprocal
not only because the activities engaged in by victim and pilot are
dissimilar, but also because the victim exposes the pilot to no risk
and, indeed, cannot expose the pilot to the same type of risk. The
pilot's activity is not typical in the victim's locality, the ground:
22 See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 538.
23 Id. at 550 (emphasis added).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 540-41.
26 Id. at 543.
27 Id. at 542.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 542, 549.
30 Id. at 542.
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it does not create a "background risk." In such situations, tort
law has traditionally imposed strict liability on the pilot 1
Fletcher's theory becomes more complicated when he de-
velops his analysis to show how negligence fits into the paradigm
of reciprocity. He suggests that in some instances, the pilot of a
plane that collides with another plane (or, as is more likely, his
survivors) may have a right to compensation. If one pilot engages
in extreme behavior-for example, by doing loops in the air-the
risk to which he exposes the other pilot may become nonreciprocal,
even though in the world of these pilots the risk of collision is a
background risk and even though they engage in activity of the
same general order. 2 Fletcher seems to be saying that a significant
difference in the degree of risk may become a difference in the
order of risk as well;3 but he does not say so explicitly. In this
manner, Fletcher seems unconsciously to introduce notions of
reasonableness into his paradigm of reciprocity. How does one
determine when a difference in degree becomes a difference in
order? One decides whether the defendant acted negligently, that
is, beyond "the bounds of reciprocity.""3 But Fletcher does not
say how "negligence" under a reciprocity standard would differ
from "negligence" under a reasonableness standard.
Fletcher's theory creates other related problems, which he
recognizes. First, how does one decide when a risk is of the same
order as another risk?35 To compare a series of what he would
call background risks, how does the risk to others created by
owning a vicious dog compare to the risk of owning a docile dog?
Of owning a cat? Of owning an attractive nuisance? Of owning a
motorcycle? And so forth. One might easily construct a series of
hypotheticals in which neighbors expose each other to risks of
various sorts. Are all of these truly background risks? How many
people must engage in an activity in a given locality before it
becomes a background risk?3" Do two background risks always
cancel each other out? If not, how do we determine when they
do and when they don't? Is it possible to have risks of different
orders but similar in degree?
A second problem acknowledged by Fletcher involves the
timing of the creation of risk. He describes as "at the fringes of
the paradigm of reciprocity" the conceptual difficulty posed by
31 See id. at 547-48.
32 See id. at 548.
33 See id. at 548-49.
34 Id. at 548.
35 See id. at 542, 571-72.
36 See id. at 572.
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considering a motorist who hits a pedestrian about to climb into
his car. 7 In another moment, the risks would have been reciprocal.
Are they considered nonreciprocal simply because of those few
steps? Fletcher does not distinguish among the potential for
creating a risk, the actual creation of a risk and the culmination
of a risk in injury. All of us have the potential to create risks to
others, but not all of our activity fulfills that potential. Some of
our behavior is harmless. Furthermore, when we do engage in
activity that could harm others, injury does not always result.
We must consider questions of liability only when harm has
actually resulted to at least one party. The only risks relevant to
such questions are the risks mutually created by the parties at the
time of the accident that caused the injury or injuries. Thus, in
the above hypothetical, the fact that a pedestrian momentarily
would have become a motorist is irrelevant.
In spite of such difficulties, Fletcher's theory is basically
sound and the issue of who should bear the loss of injuries caused
by dangerous products fits neatly into his analysis. Under a
paradigm of reciprocity, it would seem that all injuries proxi-
mately caused by dangerous products are the result of nonre-
ciprocal risks and are therefore recoverable. Such risks are
nonreciprocal because plaintiff and defendant are not engaged in
the same category of activity: the defendant is manufacturing
and marketing a dangerous product; the plaintiff is using, or is a
bystander to one using, such a product." The latency of a danger
more easily discoverable by the manufacturer than by the con-
sumer increases the degree of the nonreciprocal risk. If the dan-
ger is obvious, however, it does not make the risk reciprocal.
Therefore, the obviousness of the danger is irrelevant to the
initial determination that the victim has been exposed to a non-
reciprocal risk and deserves compensation.
Application of the paradigm of reciprocity is complicated in
37 Id. at 549 n.46.
88 A more intricate analysis might apply in cases of pure economic harm
rather than personal injury. Where the manufacturer subjects the consumer only
to the risk of economic harm, such as loss of income when the product falls, tio
consumer's failure to prevent or mitigate damages creates a risk of manufacturer
liability which could be considered the creation of a reciprocal risk. Both parties
are engaged in the general market of selling and buying goods for mutual economic
benefit. However, if the categories are defined more narrowly, one could say that
the manufacturer-selling market is a category distinct from the buyer-using mar-
ket. As in the antitrust area, the crucial question becomes one of market, or cate-
gory, definition. Rather than attempting to balance economic losses through torts
theory, cases involving only economic harm are probably best left to principles of
the Uniform Commercial Code which speaks directly to such concepts as con.
sequential damages and the duties to prevent and to mitigate economic harms.
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dangerous-products cases by the fact that there may be several
classes of parties to a case. Indeed, this factor seems to confuse
Fletcher in his brief treatment of products-liability issues. He
considers the case of a pedestrian suing an automobile manufac-
turer for injuries caused by design defects,"' stating:
In these cases, the ultimate issue is whether the motoring public as
a whole should pay a higher price for automobiles in order to com-
pensate manufacturers for their liability costs to pedestrians. The
rationale for puttig the costs on the motoring public is that motor-
ing, as a whole, imposes a nonreciprocal risk on pedestrians and
other bystanders....40
i this passage, Fletcher seems to fall back into the reasonable-
ness paradigm without noticing what he has done. The language
conflicts with his earlier argument that tort law should be con-
cerned with justice between individuals. 4 Logically, Fletcher
should state the ultimate issue as whether the activity of manu-
facturing and marketing a dangerous, but socially useful, article
puts a nonreciprocal risk of physical harm on the individual plain-
tiff consumer, whether user or bystander. For Fletcher to assume
cost spreading by the manufacturer as inevitable, and to shift
his focus to reciprocity between all consumers of a certain dan-
gerous product (via the manufacturer) and bystanders injured
by that product is to succumb to the multistep cost-benefit analy-
sis he deplores.4
Fletcher correctly is skeptical about the merits of cost-
benefit analysis in tort law. In products-liability cases, cost-
benefit analysis requires balancing personal injury oranges against
economic apples, while simultaneously focusing on the individual
consumer harmed by product X and on all consumers of that
product-a difficult feat indeed. For torts analysis purposes,
whether costs will be passed on to the consumers of product X
should be deemed irrelevant in adjusting rights as between the
manufacturer of product X and the individual injured by that
product. It is the manufacturer who creates the initial risk, not
all the consumers of the product.
2. Should the Manufacturer Compensate?
Under the paradigm of reciprocity, injuries sustained as a
result of reciprocal risks go uncompensated. Injuries resulting
from the imposition of a nonreciprocal risk are compensated, un-
39 Fletcher, supra note 1, at 570.
40 Id.
41 See id. at 538, 542.
42 See id. at 573.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 19731
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW (Vol. 48:1065
less the defendant has an "excuse" for his behavior. The avail-
ability of an excuse does not signify social approval of the actor's
conduct in general. Rather it indicates that, in a particular in-
stance, the actor's conduct was understandable, although perhaps
not reasonable, and he should not have to pay damages for the
injury it caused. 3 "Excuse" must be distinguished from its ana-
logue in the paradigm of reasonableness, "justification." Justifi-
cation involves changing a norm by stating that conduct will now
and in the future be regarded as reasonable 'nd therefore non-
actionable.44 Thus, the paradigm of reasonableness merges the
two inquiries of reciprocity-the victim's right to compensa-
tion and the defendant's responsibility for payment-into one
inquiry 5
Fletcher discusses the two types of excuses that are relevant
to the paradigm of reciprocity, the excuse of compulsion and that
of unavoidable ignorance.40 Only the latter is available to a manu-
facturer who markets a dangerous product,47 and it should be
available only in a limited class of cases. If a risk is latent in a
product, a manufacturer cannot be expected to know that it is
dangerous until it has harmed someone. Thus, he should be ex-
cused from liability for at least the first injury. However, if a
danger is obvious, the manufacturer cannot argue that he did
not know that his product might injure someone. He has no
excuse.
Without a way to legitimate his actions, the manufacturer
might want to assert defenses based on the plaintiff's conduct
or the conduct of others, such as assumption of risk or contribu-
tory negligence. Under the reciprocity theory, neither of these
arguments is doctrinally logical. Fletcher acknowledges this fact,
but glosses over it by stating that the rationale for limiting
liability by means of proving a "self-regarding risk" created by
plaintiff "is unrelated to the paradigm of reciprocity. ' 48 Although
it is possible to engraft carefully limited and defined defenses onto
the paradigm of reciprocity by using the cost-benefit balancing
approach of the reasonableness theory, I suggest that such ex-
ceptions to absolute manufacturer liability should not be intro-
duced.
43 See id. at 551-52, 559. Note that the question of excuse remains separato
from the question of plaintiff's entitlement to recovery. Id. at 53-54.
.44 Id. at 558-59.
45 Id. at 542.
46 Id. at 551-53.
47 The risk presented by dangerous products closely resembles the risk In
ultrahazardous-activity cases analyzed by Fletcher. In such cases, only the excuse of
unavoidable ignorance is commonly available. Id. at 554-59.
48 Id. at 549 n.44.
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THEORIES OF Lum~nrxy
A. Caveat Concerning Obviousness and Unavoidability
As will be seen, the role and weight assigned to the factor
of obviousness in products-liability cases have varied depending
on the plaintiff's underlying theory of recovery, a result which
leaves uncertain the protection available to consumers. Before
proceeding to an examination of the case law concerning danger-
ous products, attention should be drawn to a distinction that will
reappear from time to time throughout this discussion: the dif-
ference between the obviousness of a danger and its unavoid-
ability. A given product may have dangerous features that are
apparent to the user, i.e., that are obvious. Alternatively, the
dangers may be latent in a product. Either obvious or latent
dangers may also be unavoidable, i.e., it may be technologically
impossible for the manufacturer to design a product that fulfills
the identical function but is not dangerous.
Traditionally, manufacturers have not been held liable for
an injury sustained in the use of any unavoidably dangerous
product. If the danger is latent, a manufacturer may have a duty
to warn the user, but the warning may not be necessary if the
defect is obvious. In Albert v. J. & L. Engineering Co.,49 the
plaintiff's hand was injured while he was cleaning a sugar-cane-
harvesting machine. Expert testimony established that the in-
stallation of protective guards would have rendered the machine
inoperable. Since the defect's obviousness negated the need for
a warning, the manufacturer was absolved of liability for negli-
gent design. The principle illustrated by Albert is recognized
in comment k to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts which provides that unavoidably unsafe products will not
be deemed unreasonably dangerous so long as they are properly
prepared and marketed and accompanied by proper warnings.
Under the paradigm of reasonableness, the manufacturer's
conduct is termed justifiable, because the benefits produced by it
outweigh the costs it entails. Refusal to justify such conduct,
however, would neither offend logic nor impede economic progress;
unavoidability need not always exempt the manufacturer from
liability. Under the paradigm of reciprocity, one who manufac-
tures and sells an unavoidably dangerous product, such as a knife,
creates a nonreciprocal risk to the consumer. If injury results
from use of the knife, the consumer should be compensated. This
allocation of cost would not halt the manufacture of knives.
49 214 So. 2d 212 (La. App. 1968).
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Protecting the autonomy of the individual does not require
that the community forego activities that serve its interests. In the
case of socially useful activities, then, insulation can take the form
of damage awards shifting the cost of the deprivation from the in-
dividual to the agency inexcusably causing it. The burden should
fall on the wealth-shifting mechanism of the tort system to insulate
individual interests against community demands. By providing
compensation for injuries exacted in the public interest, the tort
system can protect individual autonomy by taxing, but not prohib-
iting, socially useful activities."
Despite the clear distinction between unavoidably dangerous
products and obviously dangerous products, many courts either
fail to recognize it or refuse to find it legally significant. As a
result, manufacturers have been absolved from liability for mar-
keting obviously dangerous products when the danger might have
been corrected. In the leading case of Campo v. Scofield,"1 the
manufacturer was held free from liability for alleged negligence
in the design of an onion-topping machine with exposed blades.
The court failed to accord legal significance to the distinction
between obviousness and unavoidability, dismissing the complaint
in spite of the plaintiff's assertion that he was prepared to show
the availability and feasibility of safeguards. 2
B. Liability for Harm Resulting from Negligent
Failure to Warn
1. The Duty
Even where the danger is unavoidable, the manufacturer still
has a duty to warn. However, where the danger is obvious, a suit
or count based on negligent failure to warn will usually fail. If
the manufacturer can reasonably expect the user to see and ap-
preciate the danger, it is assumed that the danger carries its own
warning and the manufacturer has no independent duty to advise
caution. When a high school gymnast sought recovery for in-
juries received on a trampoline, the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that the manufacturer had no duty to warn. 4
50 Fletcher, supra note 1, at 568-69.
51 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
52 See id. at 471-72, 95 N.E.2d at 803-04.
53 Note, The Manufacturer's Duty to Warn of Dangers Involved in the Use
of a Product, 1967 Wash. L.Q. 206, 213.
54 Garrett v. Nissen Corp., 84 N.M. 16, 21, 498 P.2d 1359, 1364 (1972). The
court stated that the manufacturer had no duty to warn because the plaintiff had
actual knowledge of the danger. However, the manufacturer's standard of care should
be determined by what is reasonably foreseeable at the time he manufactures and
markets the product. If he bad a duty to warn and did not do so, he breached hlis
duty. If the plaintiff nonetheless had actual knowledge of the dangers involved, this
knowledge could be viewed as evidence that the plaintiff assumed the risk.
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2. A Warning Should Always Be Required
The danger inherent in a particular product design may be
easily discernible and yet not fully appreciated by the user. The
plaintiff in Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop,5 who suffered a
detached retina when the rubber exerciser she was using slipped
and snapped back into her face, alleged that the manufacturer
was liable for negligent failure to warn."0 The majority concluded
that the danger was so obvious that the manufacturer bad no
duty to warn.5 7 The dissenters argued that although the elasticity
of -the rope might be obvious, the dangers involved in doing the
recommended exercise might not be so readily apparent.U
The approach the majority in Jamieson took toward the duty
to warn is not an unusual one. For the case presented a typical
situation where the dangers involved would be obvious to most
users. Professor Noel notes that where the shortcomings of the
design and its attendant dangers will be fully appreciated by
most users courts generally have found no duty to warn the occa-
sional inexperienced or naive user. 9 He correctly questions the
wisdom of this approach 0 It is a simple matter to give adequate
warning, and this should be done even if only a few users need
the education.
C. Liability for Harm Resulting from a Negligent Design
All jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for negligent
design. However, the claim that an obviously dangerous product
has been negligently designed is not always treated sympathet-
ically. Some courts have allowed the obviousness of a defect to
preclude liability as a matter of law. Others have placed obvious-
ness in the "unreasonable risk" calculus as a factor tending to
exculpate the manufacturer because it decreases the likelihood
of harm. And a third group has concluded that obviousness is
irrelevant to the manufacturer's duty.
1. The Campo Doctrine-Obviousness Precludes Liability
as a Matter of Law
In many jurisdictions obviousness is likely to present an ob-
stacle to establishing an initial breach of duty by the manufac-
55 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 355 US. 855 (1957).
56 Id. at 24.
7 See id. at 29-30, 33.
58 Id. at 34-35.
59 Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings,
23 Sw. L.J. 256, 272-73 (1969).
60 Id. at 273.
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turer. The view most unfavorable to plaintiffs is the one ad-
vanced by the New York Court of Appeals in Campo v. Scofield.01
That case treats the allegation and proof of the latency of the
peril as necessary to the establishment of a cause of action for
negligent design.
The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or any
other article, dangerous because of the way in which it functions,
and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it
free from latent defects and concealed dangers. Accordingly, if a
remote user sues a manufacturer of an article for injuries suffered,
he must allege and prove the existence of a latent defect or a danger
not known to the plaintiff or other users .... 62
The Campo approach has been reconfirmed by the New York
high court in two subsequent decisions. In the first, the court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit by a child who had been injured
in a fall from a dangerously designed doorstoop. The court found
the failure to allege latency fatal to the plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion.63 In the second, the court of appeals held that the supplier
of a scaffold was under no duty of reasonable care to furnish
safe chattels where the defect was patent.04
The Campo doctrine has not been confined to New York. In
other jurisdictions plaintiffs have been denied recovery, as a mat-
ter of law, where the danger was obvious and where the manu-
facturer allegedly could have eliminated the defect.05 Particu-
larly frequent are cases involving insufficiently safeguarded lawn-
mowers, with a substantial number of courts declaring that the
Campo doctrine precludes recovery in the absence of allegations
and proof that the defect was latent.00
Although some have questioned "whether the Campo case
stands for the proposition that an obvious danger can never be
an unreasonably dangerous one,"0 7 the language in Campo and
the cases just cited indicate that it does. In New York, patency
of the defect requires a finding of no breach of duty as a matter
01 301 N.Y. 468, 99 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
62 Id. at 471, 95 N.E.2d at 803.
03 See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143 N.E.2d 895, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699 (1957).
.04 See Sarnoff v. Charles Schad, Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 180, 239 N.E.2d 194, 292
N.Y.S.2d 93 (1968).
65 See, e.g., Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815 (1972)
(bicycle without headlight or reflector); Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377
S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1964) (load-binder without a safety ratchet); Tyson v. Long
Mfg. Co., 249 N.C. 557, 107 S.E.2d 170 (1959) (insufficiently guarded tobacco
harvester).
66 See, e.g., Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md. 282, 252 A.2d 855(1969); Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 96 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
07 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 215 (Supp. 1968).
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of law. Justification for this approach is not apparent. Most
courts deem it sufficient to rely on the bald statement from Campo-
that "the manufacturer is under no duty to render a machine or
other article 'more' safe-as long as the danger to be avoided is
obvious and patent to all." ' The Caampo court's position was ap-
parently grounded on the notion that if manufacturers are to be
required to install all possible safety devices, this fiat should be
legislative, not judicial. 9
Despite the criticism by Harper and James that the Campo
doctrine is "a vestigial carryover from pre-MacPherson days when
deceit was needed for recovery,17 there was minimal judicial re-
action against it for 15 years. During the late 1960's, however,
a progressive trend emerged. Increasingly, negligent design came
to be viewed as a jury question even where the danger was
obvious.7'
2. Obviousness as One Factor Bearing on the Manufacturer's
Duty
The liberalizing trend just noted is evident in two recent
negligent-design cases. In Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., - the
plaintiff had recovered from the manufacturer of a hay-baler
which lacked certain safety features. The defendant appealed,
claiming, among other things, error in the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury that a manufacturer had no duty to provide a
guard or other protective device against a patent peril.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
stating:
It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from
liability if the defect in the design of his product is patent but ap-
plies the duty if such a defect is latent is somewhat anomalous.
The manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to
68 301 N.Y. at 472, 9 N.E.2d at 804.
69 See id. at 47S, 95 N.E.2d at 80.
70 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1544 (1956).
71 Thus, in Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967),
the court upheld the jury's right to determine whether or not a lawnmower was
negligently designed. And, in Brandon v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 342 F.2d S19
(3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam), the court affirmed a jury verdict for a plaintiff who
claimed that a fork lift was negligently designed because it lacked safety equip-
ment, despite the fact that the design defect was obvious. Finally, in Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965), a builder-vendor failed to install
an inexpensive valve. This omission resulted in serious burns to a 16-month-old
child by 190- to 210-degree water. The court found the defect was not patent, but,
in dictum, questioned the requirement of latency and concluded that "obvioumsn
of a danger does not necessarily preclude a jury finding of unreasonable risk and
negligence." Id. at 87, 207 A.2d at 323.
72 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970).
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escape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we
think, ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in
its obvious form.73
The trend away from Campo is also evident in Byrnes v.
Economic Machinery Co.74 The plaintiff had been injured when
a fellow employee activated a machine while the plaintiff was ad-
justing it. Although the machine was obviously dangerous, since
its moving parts were exposed during adjustment, a Michigan
appellate court reversed -the summary judgment that the de-
fendant had been granted.
The Byrnes court was confronted with Fisher v. Johnson
Milk Co.,75 a case that recently had been decided by the Michigan
Supreme Court. Fisher held, as a matter of law, that a wire milk-
bottle carrier was not negligently designed, even though it was
without a false bottom to prevent breakage. The holding was
premised on the fact that the danger in the carrier was obvious. 0
Fisher seemed to adopt Campo without qualification, 77 and also
relied heavily on another case we have already discussed, Jamie-
son v. Woodward & Lothrop.78 Nevertheless, the Byrnes court
succeeded in distinguishing the facts before it from the other
three cases. It did so by cutting through the rhetoric of the
"latent-defect" rule:
In reaching their decisions, the courts made much of the need for
a latent defect or danger to be present before a duty can be im-
posed on a manufacturer. In reality, these requirements bear on the
unreasonableness of the risk to which one is exposed.... If a risk
is unreasonable and foreseeable, a duty on the manufacturer's part
may arise. In... [Fisher] the plaintiff was not exposed to a fore-
seeable unreasonable risk. Therefore, the manufacturer was not
subject to liability .... 70
The court noted the "modern tort concept" that awareness of the
defect does not itself preclude recovery. Since the manufacturer
knew that the machine would have to be continually serviced and
adjusted, and since it was arguable that the risk created was un-
73 Id. at 517, 476 P.2d at 718-19.
74 41 Mich. App. 192, 200 N.W.2d 104 (1972).
75 383 Mich. 158, 174 N.W.2d 752 (1970).
76 See id. at 160-62, 174 N.W.2d at 753-54.
77 See id. at 162-63, 174 N.W.2d at 754.
78 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 899 (1957), cited
in 383 Mich. at 160-61, 174 N.W.2d at 753-54.
79 41 Mich. App. at 201, 200 N.W.2d at 108. There is an alternative rationale
that the Byrnes court did not mention. Fisher may represent a situation where the
danger was unavoidable since a false bottom would not necessarily have prevented
the bottles from breaking if dropped. Unavoidability of the danger can logically
be deemed to exempt the manufacturer from liability under the paradigm of
reasonableness.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
reasonable, the court ordered the case to be submitted to the
jury.80
In view of the fact that the court was operating within the
paradigm of reasonableness, this disposition was clearly preferable
to adoption of the approach taken by the Campo court. One way
to determine what is an "unreasonable risk" is to balance the like-
lihood and gravity of the foreseeable harm against the cost of
eliminating the risk.8' Since obviousness of a danger should create
caution on the part of users, thus reducing the likelihood of harm,
under this equation it seems appropriate to regard obviousness
as one factor in assessing the manufacturer's dutyP As pre-
viously stated, however, under no circumstances should obvious-
ness be held to preclude manufacturer liability as a matter of law.
3. The Effect of Obviouszess on Affirmative Defemses
Despite the substantial number of negligent-design cases
holding that obviousness of a design defect is relevant in assessing
the manufacturer's duty, there has been a recent move toward the
position that obviousness is to be considered only in the area of
affirmative defenses. For example, in Jamieson v. Woodward &
Lothrop,1 the dissenting judge suggested that obviousness "would
seem to be pertinent... on ,the question of whether the plaintiff
assumed the risk... rather than on the question of the manu-
facturer's negligence." 4 Similar sentiments were expressed by the
California Supreme Court in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co!s There,
the court stated unequivocally that in regard to the negligent-
design count, "the obviousness of peril is relevant to the manu-
facturer's defenses, not to the issue of duty."3 10 The practical im-
80 See id. at 201-03, 200 N.W.2d at 108-09.
81 Cf. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1542 (1956).
82 The Restatement (Second) of Torts also seems to be in harmony with the
view that obviousness of a danger does not necessarily preclude a finding of negli-
gent design. Section 398 states:
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it
dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability
to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by
its probable use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reason-
able care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 398 (1965). Comment a to this section notes that
the section is a special application of the rule governing negligent manufacture
stated in section 395. This latter section invokes as its standard of liability "an
unreasonable risk of causing physical harm" to those using the product for a fore-
seeable purpose.
83 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 355 U.S. S55 (1957).
84 Id. at 38.
85 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) (noted in 49 Tex.
L. Rev. 591 (1971)).
8 2 Cal. 3d at 473, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 634. This view was
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pact of this distinction is found in the burden of proof: plaintiff
must prove breach of the manufacturer's duty; defendant must
establish any affirmative defense.
Traditionally, all types of plaintiffs' conduct classifiable
as assumption of risk, ordinary contributory negligence or misuse
have operated as a bar to recovery on a negligent-design count. 87
To consider the appropriateness of this result in cases involving
obvious danger, it is necessary to review the ways in which the
rules have been applied.
a. Assumption of the Risk- A person is said to assume
the risk of an activity when he knowingly encounters a danger
and fully appreciates the risks involved. However, the fact that
a person assumed the risk of an activity does not necessarily
preclude a recovery for injuries suffered. For assumption of the
risk only constitutes a defense to an action if the plaintiff can be
said to have unreasonably assumed the risk. In this situation,
the danger accepted is disproportionate to the advantage sought.
On the other hand, if the plaintiff had knowledge of the risk and
voluntarily, but reasonably, proceeded to encounter it, he may
still recover. 8 While obviousness may play a role in the deter-
mination, the ordinary balancing theory used does not take into
account the fact that the manufacturer of an obviously dangerous
product creates a risk to others while those who purchase the
product jeopardize only their own safety.
What kind of fact situation would support a finding that
plaintiff reasonably encountered a known danger? Suppose he is
an employee assigned to use a meat grinder having no guard to
protect his fingers. If he agrees to use the machine, and due to
momentary inadvertence allows his fingers to get caught, what
would be the probable result? A jury could well find that his
reaffirmed in the strict-liability case of Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d
1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972). See text accompanying notes 137-39 infra. Pike's
limitation on obviousness, as being relevant only to defenses, also was approved,
in dictum, in Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 918, 476 P.2d
713, 719 (1970).
87 See Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 416.
88 See id. at 440-41, 670-71. As Prosser points out, unreasonable assumption
of the risk is more properly labeled contributory negligence. Professor Robert
Keeton suggests why reasonable assumption of the risk should not bar recovery In
a negligence situation:
Why should a negligent defendant be allowed to escape liability because
the plaintiff chose to expose himself to the risk negligently created by the
defendant, if the plaintiff's choice was reasonable? Should we not instead
say that the defendant's negligence unfairly confronted plaintiff with a
hard choice in which exposure to defendant's negligently created risk
seemed the lesser evil and that, therefore, the defendant should be liable?
Keeton, Assumption of Product Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61, 71 (1965) (citation omitted).
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voluntary decision to work with a dangerous machine was rea-
sonable, i.e., that he had not unreasonably assumed the risk. His
inadvertence, if relevant at all, would not constitute assumption
of risk, but at the most contributory negligence.
Suppose, however, that an experienced mechanic operates a
trencher, the drive belt of which has been set in a tight position
by the manufacturer!9 The operator has read instructions from
the manufacturer stating that the drive belt should be adjusted
so that it is loose enough to slip if an object gets caught in the
digging chain. The digging teeth catch on an underground pipe,
causing the machine to lurch forward, and as a result, the plaintiff
is injured. In this situation, the initial decision to work with a
dangerous machine appears reasonable. However, a jury would
probably conclude that the operator, by failing to comply with
the simple instructions, had unreasonably assumed the risk of
that decision. Alternatively, the jury might conclude that the
operator's failure to adjust the machine constituted contributory
negligence.
The crucial difference between the two hypotheticals is that
in the second, the plaintiff had a reasonable alternative, that of
remedying the defect himself. Since he failed to do so, the man-
ufacturer should be relieved from liability. Momentary inad-
vertence, an unavoidable human failing, is not to be equated with
a conscious decision to encounter a danger which could be elim-
inated before using the product. If manufacturers are deemed
justified in creating and marketing unavoidably dangerous prod-
ucts, justice demands users should be excused for unavoidable
moments of inadvertence as well as for reasonably encountering
a known danger.
The fact that the danger is obvious is frequently urged as
grounds for a finding that plaintiff had unreasonably assumed
the risk as a matter of law. There are at least two reasons why
reasonable assumption of risk usually should remain a jury ques-
tion despite the obviousness of the danger. In the first place, it
should be noted that although the design that creates the danger
may be plainly visible, the danger itself may either be unknown
or insufficiently appreciated." The necessity for appreciation of
the risk is set forth in the Restatement: "Except where he ex-
89 These facts are taken from Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 49 l 2d 418, 261
N.E.2d 305 (1970).
90 See Messina v. Clark Equip. Co., 263 F.2d 291, 294 (2d Cir.) (CLark, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959); cf. Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand. L.
Rev. 93, 121-22 (1972) [hereinafter Noel, Defective Products].
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pressly so agrees, a plaintiff does not assume a risk of harm arising
from the defendant's conduct unless he then knows of the ex-
istence of the risk and appreciates its unreasonable character. 0D1
The requirement that the plaintiff know of and understand
the risk is usually considered to be a subjective standard; rele-
vant evidence is the plaintiff's testimony and such factors as age
and experience." For example, in Greco v. Bucciconi Engineer-
ing Co.,93 the plaintiff was injured when metal sheets fell on his
hand because of a defect in the machine's fingers. The fingers
were supposed to catch and hold the sheets. Although the plaintiff
knew that the machine sometimes malfunctioned, he had allegedly
never seen the sheets fall while a pin, which had been inserted to
remedy the defect, was present. The court held that it was im-
possible to say, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk. It was for the jury to decide whether or not it was rea-
sonable for him to assume the sheets would not fall while the
pin was inserted . 4
Although the standard for assumption of the risk is basically
subjective, the courts have introduced an objective element into
the determination by allowing the trier of fact to consider ob-
viousness of the design defect as evidence that plaintiff must have
known of the hazard. In Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co., 5
the court stated:
No juror is compelled by the subjective nature of this test to accept
a user's testimony that he was unaware of the danger, if, in the
light of all of the evidence, he could not have been unaware of the
hazard... ; and the factors of the user's age, experience, knowl-
edge and understanding, as well as the obviousness of the defect
and the danger it poses, . .. will all be relevant to the jury's de-
termination of the issue, if raised .... 96
It is submitted that assumption of the risk should remain a sub-
jective factor. Although 99% of the population might perceive
the risk, the remaining one percent should not be precluded from
a chance to convince the jury that they, in fact, did not.
The conclusion that assumption of risk usually should re-
main a jury question is buttressed by the observation that those
who use obviously defective products often do so because they lack
viable alternatives. Many products-liability cases involve em-
ployees injured by machinery with obvious defects. Since the em-
91 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D (1965).
92 Noel, Defective Products, supra note 90, at 121-28.
93 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
94 Id. at 92-93.
Or 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
96 Id. at 430-31, 261 N.E.2d at 312 (citations omitted).
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ployee's only alternative to using the defective machine is to lose
his job, it is doubtful whether it can be said that he has volun-
tarily assumed even a very obvious riskY7 It is also true that the
low-income consumer often lacks alternatives because he simply
cannot afford the safer but more expensive product. Likewise the
consumer who relies for information on advertising may lack an
educated alternative.
Picture the consumer who buys a belt reducer on the strength
of an advertisement extolling the desirability of being slim and
the durability of the machine. However, the advertisement omits
the mention of any dangers. Later he reads a newspaper article
discussing the dangers inherent in using any belt reducer. If the
buyer tries to return the machine, the seller is likely to refuse,
arguing that it is not dangerous or that, if it is, this fact should
have been apparent from the outset.
It is bad enough that the consumer is frequently without any
real alternative to using an obviously dangerous machine. But
matters are made worse if the nature of the danger requires con-
stant vigilance on the part of the consumer, as, for example, in
the case of heavy machinery with unguarded moving parts. Since
inadvertence is never really totally avoidable, the consumer runs
the risk of an accident. However, as has been argued earlier,
the possibility that inadvertence may result in injury should not
make the consumer's choice to use the machine unreasonable. The
issue of the reasonableness of the assumption of risk should be
referred to the jury.
b. Contributory Negligene-In contrast to contributory
negligence amounting to assumption of the risk, ordinary con-
tributory negligence consists of either unreasonable failure to ap-
preciate a risk or an inadvertent mistake in dealing with a riskY8
The first category, unreasonable failure to discover a risk, is
clearly not applicable to obvious dangers. Plaintiff's inadvertence,
however, is frequently a source of claimed contributory negligence.
A significant recent circumvention of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine was made in Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.,"
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court. There an employee
injured his hand on a punch press that allegedly had been negli-
gently designed. The machine could have been equipped with a
device allowing activation only when both the operator's hands
were pressing buttons, thus preventing the injury. The court,
97 See text accompanying notes 194-99 infra.
98 See Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 424.
99 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
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after holding that the trial court had erroneously dismissed the
plaintiff's claim, went on to consider the defendant's contention
that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent. Noting that
the defense had been held unavailable in negligence cases "where
considerations of policy and justice dictate," the court con-
cluded that on the facts before it contributory negligence was
unavailable.100
The asserted negligence of plaintiff-placing his hand under the
ram while at the same time depressing the foot pedal-was the very
eventuality the safety devices were designed to guard against. It
would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install
safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for
the very injury the duty was meant to protect against .... 101
Simply stated, Bexiga held that a plaintiff will not be deemed
contributorily negligent for using a machine in a fully foreseeable,
if inadvertent, way, if the danger could have been safeguarded
against by the manufacturer.
As precedent for its holding, the Bexiga court cited two cases.
The first, Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 102 dealt with the sale
of liquor to a visibly intoxicated customer. The court refused to
recognize the claim that the plaintiff's drunkenness amounted to
contributory negligence. The second, Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
Car Co.,103 involved an automaker's express warranty that its car
had a safe top constructed from one piece of steel. The plaintiff
had been injured when he overturned the car and suffered a gash
on his head from a seam in the roof. The Michigan Supreme Court
declared contributory negligence unavailable as a defense against
a warranty-of-safety claim.
The logic of these cases is compelling. Once it is established
that the defendant has a duty to protect persons from the con-
sequences of their own foreseeable faulty conduct, it makes no
sense to deny recovery because of the nature of the plaintiff's
conduct. It has been suggested that this reasoning could eliminate
the defense of contributory negligence from most negligence and
strict-liability cases, allowing it to be used only in cases in which
the plaintiff is the party most capable of cost spreading and
accident-level optimization. 104
The fact that contributory negligence is not completely
tossed out the window by Bexiga does not mean, however, that
100 Id. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286. New Jersey is a jurisdiction which classifies
unreasonable assumption of the risk as contributory negligence. See Ettin v. Ava
Truck Leasing, Inc., 53 NJ. 463, 472-73, 251 A.2d 278, 282-83 (1969).
101 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
102 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
103 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
104 See Comment, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 923, 929-31 (1973).
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it is a good doctrine. In fact, the New York legislature has fre-
quently considered abolishing it.?05 And the New York Court of
Appeals has likewise indicated an openness toward substituting
comparative negligence for contributory negligence. In Dole v.
Dow Chemical Co., 6 the court allowed defendant joint tortfeasors
to seek either partial or total indemnification by impleader, with
the amount of indemnification based on a comparison of the
negligence of the tortfeasors. A logical extension of this doctrine
would have allowed a defendant to counterclaim or claim a set-off
for plaintiff's negligence, thus introducing a system of compara-
tive negligence between plaintiffs and defendants as well as be-
tween defendant joint tortfeasors 0 7
In Codling v. Paglia,108 the court of appeals had a chance to
extend Dole to a situation involving contributory negligence.
However, because the driver of the defective vehicle had already
voluntarily settled with the bystander-plaintiffs, and because the
court felt that substituting comparative negligence for contribu-
tory negligence is "more appropriate for legislative address," the
court refused to extend Dole into the contributory negligence
area " The court did leave open the possibility of judicial reform
in the event of legislative inaction, stating: "We do not, how-
ever, now apply these [Dole apportionment] principles to the
Paglia settlement.' 10 The court acknowledged that it had been
critical of the doctrine of contributory negligence,"' and two
judges filed a concurring opinion arguing that the time had come
to substitute comparative negligence for contributory negli-
gence.'n Therefore, it seems possible that the court could extend
Dole when confronted with a contributory negligence situation
where there has been no pretrial settlement by any of the parties.
Although seemingly appropriate, a different kind of limitation
on the defense of contributory negligence apparently has not been
urged in negligent-design cases. It is common doctrine that when
the defendant creates a risk in reckless disregard of the safety
of others, the plaintiff can recover despite his own negligence.12 3
Admittedly, characterizing the manufacturer's conduct as reck-
105 For a discussion of one of the proposed statutes that did not pass, ne Note,
Proposed Adoption of Comparative Negligence in the State of New York, 25 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 184 (1956).
106 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S2d 382 (1972).
307 Comment, 47 N.Y.UL.. Rev. 815, 833 (1972).
.08 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 NE.2d 622, 345 N.YS.2d 461 (1973).
109 Id. at 344-45, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y..2d at 471-72.
110 Id. at 344, 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471 (emphasis added).
111 Id., 298 N.E.2d at 630, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 471.112 See id. at 345-48, 298 N.E2d at 630-32, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 472-74.
113 See Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 Ark. L.
Rev. 1, 5-6 (1946).
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less would be possible only where the product has caused pre-
vious injuries or where other factors indicate a high probability
of harm. However, since the rule of contributory negligence per-
sists despite heavy criticisml 4 -a "chronic invalid who will not
die"1 5 -all possible avenues for avoiding it should be utilized
and the possibilities inherent in the reckless-disregard theory
should not be ignored.
4. Conclusions Regarding the Effect of Obviousness
in Negligent-Design Actions
The effect that an objvious danger will have on what is now
termed a negligent-design case will vary depending upon the
paradigm of responsibility that the courts choose to apply. For
those which insist on using the paradigm of reasonableness, ob-
viousness of a danger will remain relevant. Since that standard
revolves around a utilitarian balancing of the risks created by the
defendant against the benefits of his conduct, obviousness of the
danger should be considered as a factor minimizing the likelihood
of harm. If the danger is unlikely to cause frequent injury, if the
foreseeable injuries will usually be slight, and if the cost of pre-
venting the injuries will be high, it can be said that defendant's
failure to adopt a safer design is reasonable.
Once a breach of a defendant's duty is established under this
paradigm, however, only intentional and unreasonable conduct,
never mere inadvertence, should defeat the plaintiff's right to re-
cover. For the most part, traditional notions of contributory neg-
ligence"6 and assumption of risk should disappear. In particular,
when the probability of the plaintiff's inadvertence is foreseeable
and the manufacturer has the capacity to guard against that con-
tingency, he should not be released from his duty toward plaintiff
simply because the danger is obvious. As the Bexiga court so
correctly perceived, the defendant's duty to provide safeguards
against obvious dangers is imposed precisely to prevent harm to
inadvertent users.117 Therefore, the user's foreseeable conduct
should not negate the duty.
The conclusions reached with respect to the paradigm of rea-
sonableness would be significantly different were a reciprocity
analysis applied. Under this theory, the consumer-plaintiff always
114 See, e.g., James, Contributory Negligence, 62 Yale L.J. 691, 704-05 (1993).
115 Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 418.
116 As Prosser points out, "contributory negligence" is an inaccurate term
since negligence traditionally has meant conduct which creates an undue risk of
harm to others. See id.
117 See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
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would be entitled to compensation because of the nonreciprocal
risk of harm imposed on him by the manufacturer. Nor could
the manufacturer successfully claim either of the two excuses rec-
ognized under the reciprocity theory."s The excuse of compul-
sion would not be available in any products-liability action. And
in obvious-danger cases the excuse of unavoidable ignorance
would never be available." 9
Affirmative defenses based on reasonableness justifications
are doctrinally inconsistent with the reciprocity theory and would
not be allowed. However, if the evidence proved that the injured
plaintiff specifically rejected an available and proffered safeguard
at the time of purchase, and did so with full knowledge of the
nature and extent of the potential danger, recovery should be
denied. Rather than labeling this situation assumption of the risk,
the manufacturer's conduct could be deemed not a proximate
cause of the injury. An alternative solution would be to find that
the plaintiff had failed to prove a manufacturer-created risk, but
rather that the risks had been jointly created.
D. Strict Liability in Tort
1. The Manufacturer's Breach of Duty
A substantial number of states now hold manufacturers
strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by the marketing of dan-
gerous and defective products. This approach eases the plaintiff's
task considerably by requiring less extensive proof than is de-
manded in a negligent-design case. But does the obviousness of
a danger affect recovery under a strict-liability theory? The an-
swer depends upon whether the court adopts the formulation set
out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts or adopts the one de-
veloped by the California Supreme Court-the Greenman-Cronin
theory. We will begin by considering the Restatement's approach.
a. The Restatement Approach--Section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts imposes liability, regardless of neg-
ligence, on one "who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user." A defect in design, as well
as a defect in the material used or in construction, may render a
product unreasonably dangerous.
Comment i to section 402A defines "unreasonably danger-
ous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be con-
118 See text accompanying notes 43-47 supra.
119 However, in the case of a latent danger, if the manufacturer were un-
avoidably ignorant of its existence, he could be excused from liability for the first
injury.
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templated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its charac-
teristics." This language suggests that the drafters of the Restate-
ment felt unreasonableness should be determined by reference
to an objective standard, rather than by reference to the impre-
cise subjective expectations of the injured party. This conclusion
seems clear since comment i speaks of dangers beyond those
"which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer," not
dangers beyond those actually contemplated by the injured plain-
tiff.
A subjective standard clearly would have been unwise since
it would encourage an enticingly specious argument in opposition
to the claim of any plaintiff injured by an obviously dangerous
product. It could be contended that a patent danger is never sub-
jectively unreasonable-the mere fact of purchase being used to
establish that the product's dangers did not exceed the consumer's
reasonable expectations. However, this reasoning ignores the fact
that a consumer who genuinely wants to purchase a safe product
may be forced to buy a dangerous one. In short, if accepted, the
argument would foster a result contrary to the spirit of the Re-
statement. An injured party would be penalized simply because
he made a Hobson's choice.
The objective standard of comment i suggests the following
question for jury determination: did the dangers presented by
the product exceed those that would have been expected by the
average consumer, once he had been apprised of all information
commonly known about its qualities? In answering this question
the jury would be making a comparison. It would set the risks
perceived by the hypothetical consumer against those actually
presented. If the real danger exceeded the imagined danger then
the manufacturer would be held liable. Expert testimony would
play a vital role in the determination since it would not be possi-
ble to evaluate a product's real dangers without making reference
to industry standards, dangers in design, the existence of alterna-
tive materials, methods of production or safeguards, and other
similar technical factors.
In practice, the courts have not made the inquiry just sug-
gested. Despite the fact that section 402A, read along with com-
ment i, purports to focus on the reasonableness of the danger
involved, the courts have focused on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's risk-creating conduct. The assumption is made
throughout that he knew of all the dangers involved. 120
120 See Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of Defect In the
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The reasonableness question has been decided by reverting
to the negligence test of balancing the seriousness of the harm
against the costs of avoiding it. 1 This approach differs from the
old negligence test in only one substantial way-the dangers con-
sidered are not the dangers about which a reasonable manufac-
turer should have known, but rather the dangers which are proved
to be involved in the particular case.l The obviousness of the
defect then assumes the same relevance in a strict-liability case
that it does in negligent-design actions-the more obvious the
defect, the more likely it is that users will avoid the harm.
If obviousness were considered to be but one factor in the
cost-benefit calculus used in evaluating the reasonableness of dan-
gers, no great harm would be done. Unfortunately, however, the
Campo doctrine' has crept into strict liability in some jurisdic-
tions. This disturbing trend toward denying recovery as a matter
of law to a plaintiff injured by an obviously dangerous product is
well illustrated by three cases.
In the first, Maas v. Dreher,24 an Arizona appellate court
adopted Judge Traynor's conclusion that under the Restatement
"strict liability is primarily concerned with the surprise element
of danger."'25 Therefore, the court held that a manufacturer could
not be strictly liable in tort for an open and obvious danger known
to the plaintiff. 6 The court did make it clear, however, that it had
applied an objective standard based on perceptions of the ordinary
consumer, not on the actual subjective knowledge and apprecia-
tion of the particular plaintiff. 2 Similarly, in Downey v. Moorefs
Time-Saving Equipment, Inc.,P the court stated that Indiana
law requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a latent defect
in a strict-liability case.29
Finally, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals approved the
following jury instruction in Ilniki v. Montgomery Ward Co.,'30
a strict-liability case involving lawnmower injuries:
Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 Syracuse L. Rev. 559, 563 (1969) [here-
inafter Keeton, Defect]; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 S.
L.J. 5, 15 (1965).
121 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (EfD. Pa. 1971),
af'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973).
122 Keeton, Defect, supra note 120, at 568.
123 See text accompanying notes 61-62 supra.
124 10 Ariz. App. 520,460 P.2d 191 (1969).
125 Id. at 522, 460 P.2d at 193, citing Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1965).
126 10 Ariz. App. at 523, 460 P.2d at 194.
127 Id., 460 P.2d at 194.
128 432 F.2d 1088 (7th Cir. 1970).
129 Id. at 1093.
130 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1966).
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The manufacturer of a machine is under no duty to design or pro-
duce a machine that is accident proof or fool proof, nor is he under
any duty to guard against an injury from an obvious peril, or from
a source manifestly dangerous. 131
b. The California Approach-An Anti-402A Theory-
Without articulating the label, the California Supreme Court
recently moved toward the reciprocity approach in evolving an
"anti-402A" theory of strict products liability. The development
took place in two companion cases interpreting the following
standard that had been formulated in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.:132 "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used
without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being."' 83
In the first case, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,114 the court
required proof of defectiveness but rejected an interpretation of
Greenman which would have necessitated a showing that a prod-
uct was "unreasonably dangerous." To do so, the court reasoned,
would be to burden "the injured plaintiff with proof of an element
which rings of negligence." 185 But, since the purposes of strict li-
ability in tort are to relieve the plaintiff from the problems in-
herent in proving negligence and to make the manufacturer liable
for injuries caused by defective products, an "unreasonably dan-
gerous" requirement would be a backward step.",6
In the second case, Luque v. McLean,a? the court had to
decide whether or not obviousness retained any possible relevance
to a determination of the manufacturer's duty. Certainly, Cronin
implied that it did not. However, before the Luque court could
reach this conclusion, it had to overcome some troublesome and
ambiguous language in Greenman:
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that
plaintiff proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in
a way it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in design
and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made the
Shopsmith unsafe for its intended use.138
The court concluded that the language did not make latency
a necessary element in plaintiff's cause of action for strict liability
131 Id. at 199.
132 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
133 Id. at 62, 377 P2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
134 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
135 Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
136 Id. at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
137 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
138 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701 (craphasig addcd).
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in tort. Rather, it meant that the defect must have been one as
to which the plaintiff had not voluntarily and unreasonably as-
sumed the risk, with the burden of proving assumption on the
defendantYl9 Luque thus seems to foreclose any possibility that
obviousness of a danger could be deemed relevant to the assess-
ment of the manufacturer's duty. However, this conclusion may
well be tempered by the definition of "defective" that a court
chooses to apply.
Neither Cronin nor Luque really meet the question of what
a defect is, although in Cronin the court did note the difficulty
of demarcating the term. 40 Two possible definitions can be pos-
ited. First, a defective product might be defined as one which
should not have been marketed when judged in the light of trial-
established facts regarding such things as plaintiff's injury, sta-
tistics on other persons injured by that model and the manufac-
turer's choice of material and design. This definition, however,
gets back to a hindsight reasonable-manufacturer standard, one
which the California court apparently hoped to avoid. The court
implicitly rejected a definition of "defective" based on the "sur-
prised ordinary consumer test" which makes a product unreason-
ably dangerous under comment i to Section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts.
Second, a product might be deemed defective if its dangerous
characteristics could have been avoided or mitigated through a
better manufacturing process, a safer design or more adequate
warnings. This amounts to saying two things: if a product can
be made safer, it should be, regardless of economic cost; and,
furthermore, failure to make these improvements will result in
manufacturer liability. Although obviousness of a danger would
be irrelevant to the question of initial manufacturer liability, the
test is unsatisfactory. This is because it places the burden of prov-
ing the technological feasibility of safeguarding the product on the
plaintiff although the defendant has easier access to the data rele-
vant to this inquiry.
Thus, by resorting to the requirement that a product be "de-
fective," the California court has left open the possibility of se-
mantic debate over the term's meaning. Rather than clinging to
this requirement, the court should have taken Greenman to its
logical extreme. It should have required only proof that a product
was dangerous--that in the state it was sold by the manufacturer,
it was a proximate cause of the injuries suffered. Requiring only
139 8 Cal. 3d at 141-45, S01 P.2d at 1166-69, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 446-49.
140 8 Cal. 3d at 134 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
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proof of dangerousness forces the same result as would be ob-
tained by application of the paradigm of reciprocity except in the
area of affirmative defenses. Short of an explicit acceptance of
the reciprocity analysis, this would provide the most satisfactory
structure for a strict-liability recovery.
2. Affirmative Defenses to Strict-Liability Actions
a. Under the Reasonableness Theory-If strict liability
in tort is viewed as a means to effective risk spreading when no
comprehensive insurance plan exists, affirmative defenses should
become less important if not extinct. Professor Page Keeton con-
cludes that once plaintiff has shown his injury to have resulted
proximately from defects in an improperly designed product,
"conceivably few, if any, defenses would have to be recognized
as further limitations on the makers' responsibility." 4 Even mis-
use of a bad product might not prevent plaintiff's recovery since
the defect and plaintiff's conduct each could be considered a "but
for" cause of the injuries." 2
In contrast to Keeton's restrictive approach, the Restatement
seems to take a more liberal view toward affirmative defenses.
Comment n to section 402A states that while mere failure to dis-
cover a defect or to guard against its possibility will not defeat a
plaintiff's action, voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a known
danger will. The formulation, although widely accepted, 0 leaves
two central problems unresolved. The first is found in its resort
to the ubiquitous unreasonable-conduct standard, one that is again
left insufficiently articulated. The courts have yet to fill the void
successfully; thus, the standard's precise boundaries remain un-
defined.
In Messick v. General Motors Corp.,144 one of the few cases
interpreting comment n, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ap-
plied Texas law to a section 402A case. It concluded that the
Texas Supreme Court would follow the comment and would re-
quire an unreasonable assumption of the risk to defeat recovery.
The court then affirmed a judgment for a plaintiff who continued
to drive his car despite the knowledge that its steering mecha-
nism was defective. The facts that the plaintiff needed his car to
earn a living and had invested one-sixth of his income in car pay-
141 Keeton, Defect, supra note 120, at 567.
142 Id.
148 Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 670-71; see Buttrick v. Lessard & Sow,
110 N.H. 36, 260 A.2d 111 (1969).
144 460 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1972).
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ments were vital to the finding that his continued use of the car
was reasonable. 45
A second significant shortcoming of section 402A's treatment
of plaintiff's conduct is its failure to clarify the relationship of
comment n to comment h. Comment h states that a product is not
defective when it is safe for normal handling and consumption.
This indicates that misuse is to be considered separately from
voluntary and unreasonable assumption of a known risk rather
than being subsumed thereunder. Predictably, many jurisdictions
have placed the burden of proving normal product use on the
plaintiff, while all courts view assumption of risk as an affirmative
defense. 4 6 This difference in treatment creates a problem because
any possible distinction between unreasonable assumption of the
risk and misuse is a subtle one, and the categories frequently over-
lap. For example, if the plaintiff attempts to clean a meat grinder
while the machine is running, it could be contended that he un-
reasonably assumed the risk of the activity because he had the
alternative of turning off the machine and cleaning it. It could
also be argued that the plaintiff's action was a use of the product
in a manner that could not have been reasonably foreseen by the
manufacturer and thus constituted misuse. Either label seems
logical.
Consider the facts of Bartkewiclh v. Billinger,147 a trouble-
some case which applied section 402A. The plaintiff, an experi-
enced glass-factory worker, was injured when he stuck his hand
into a glass-breaking machine to unclog a jam. The machine was
poorly designed and had no safeguards to prevent the occurrence.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff which was reversed
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with directions to enter judg-
ment for the defendant .o.v. 48 While it is clear that the court
thought the plaintiff's conduct unreasonable,14 the contrary posi-
tion is arguable on the facts. As an employee, the plaintiff's initial
decision to use the dangerous machine seems reasonable, and the
act of sticking his hand into the machine may not have been the
sort of deliberate act that should amount to an unreasonable
assumption of the risk. Unfortunately, the court did not explicitly
state the ground for its decision. There is language, however, to
145 Id. at 494.
146 See Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses Based on PlaintifPs Conduct 1968
Utah L. Rev. 267, 272-73.
147 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
148 Id. at 356-57, 247 A.2d at 606.
149 See id. at 355, 247 A.2d at 605-06.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 19731
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1065
indicate that it thought the plaintiff's conduct amounted to misuse
and not merely an unreasonable assumption of the risk: "We
believe .. that... [section 402A] should only apply to allow
recovery where the absence of the safety device caused an ac-
cidental injury which was of the type that could be expected from
the normal use of the product."1 °
The implications of this proposed reading of Bartkewich are
disturbing. Since the court ordered entry of a judgment for de-
fendant n.o.v., the case could be read as holding that plaintiff's
failure to prove normal use always defeats a section 402A claim
as a matter of law. An inadvertent mishandling of a product ap-
parently would be as fatal as deliberate misuse. While it can
hardly be certain that Bartkewich was intended to be read so
broadly, it is clear that this reading would do violence to the intent
of comment n to section 402A. For it simply cannot be said that
every misuse of a product is unreasonable. Even deliberate and
unreasonable misuse is sometimes foreseeable. Under the reason-
ableness paradigm, arguably the manufacturer should guard
against such conduct.151
Although his conduct always will be relevant to the proximate-
cause issue in a 402A case, plaintiff should not have to show nor-
mal use of the product. Once he clears the proximate-cause hurdle,
misuse, like other categories of plaintiff's conduct, should be
considered only as an affirmative defense. Otherwise, consumer-
oriented courts can be expected to view borderline problems as
questions of assumption of the risk, while manufacturer-oriented
courts will look to the doctrine of misuse. Courts should be reluc-
tant to remove from jury consideration questions concerning
the effect of plaintiff's conduct on his right to recover, regardless
of the label applied to the conduct. According to Professor Noel,
the current trend in products-liability cases is away from finding
assumption of risk as a matter of law,"52 although he indicates
that courts which are not wholeheartedly committed to the no-
tion of strict liability may be more easily persuaded to direct a
verdict against the plaintiff. 1 3
In sum, the defenses available to a section 402A action should
be severely limited. In a case like Bartkewich, for example, the
manufacturer had ample time to evaluate the necessity and fea-
sibility of safeguards. If the unguarded machine posed unreason-
able danger to users, the manufacturer's liability should not be
160 Id. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
151 See Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 669.
152 Noel, Defective Products, supra note 90, at 127.
153 Id. at 128.
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defeated absent an equally deliberate decision by the plaintiff to
encounter the danger unreasonably or to misuse the product.
A significant limitation on defenses to strict-liability actions
was achieved by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Bexiga v.
Havir Manufacturing Corp.' As will be recalled, the court held
that the defendant had a duty to install safeguards on a punch
press in order to protect users from their own foreseeable in-
advertencej 55 To let this anticipated conduct preclude liability
would be, the court said, "anomalous"; therefore, consideration
of contributory negligence was precluded.'"
Bexiga must not be read too broadly, for the court based its
decision on a limited dictum in Ettin v. Ava Truck Leasing,
Inc." Ettin had said that contributory negligence would be un-
available in special situations in the strict-liability area 13s The
Bexiga court clearly felt that it was faced with such a special sit-
uation 59 But in no way did Bexiga imply that it was overruling
Ettin's clear indication that contributory negligence would be an
available defense to most strict-liability claims.
The Ettin court had discussed favorably two earlier casesiGO
In the first,"8' the plaintiff was found contributorily negligent for
continuing to drive a truck after becoming aware that the brakes
were defective. In the second,6 -2 recovery was precluded by the
unusual and careless manner in which the plaintiff had tried to
open a glass toothbrush container. The Ettin court refused to
differentiate among misuse, ordinary contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk, citing with approval the following state-
ment from the second case:
"Simply stated, we are of the view that where a plaintiff acts or
fails to act as a reasonably prudent man in connection with use of
a warranted product or one which comes into his hands under cir-
cumstances imposing strict liability..., and such conduct proxi-
mately contributes to his injury, he cannot recover.... A manu-
facturer or seller is entitled to expect a normal use of his product.
The reach of the doctrine of strict liability in tort... should not be
extended so as to negate that expectation."163
154 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
155 See text accompanying notes 99-101 supra.
156 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
157 53 N.J. 463, 251 A.2d 278 (1969), cited in 60 N.J. at 412, 290 Ai2d at 286.
158 See 53 N.J. at 473, 251 A.2d at 283.
159 60 N.J. at 412, 290 A.2d at 286.
160 See 53 N.J. at 470-72, 251 A.2d at 281-S2.
161 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d
769 (1965).
162 Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965).
163 53 N.J. at 472, 251 A.2d at 282, quoting 45 N.J. at 574, 214 A.2d at 20.
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Thus, under Ettin and Bexiga it seems likely that plaintiff's failure
to exercise reasonable care, regardless of the label, will bar his
recovery unless that conduct was foreseeable and preventable by
the manufacturer.
b. Under the Paradigm of Reciprocity-Are there any
doctrinally logical defenses under the reciprocity theory? As we
have already discussed, the answer is no, because neither the ex-
cuse of compulsion nor that of unavoidable ignorance will be
available to a manufacturer in an obviously-dangerous-product
case. 164 We might review, however, the "reasonableness" excep-
tions that courts might be expected to make to the reciprocity
theory. It bears repeating that these utilitarian exceptions, if ap-
plied, should be carefully limited and defined, and should be con-
sidered solely as matters of affirmative defenses. Defenses might
be available in cases of: (1) conscious and intentional misuse of
the product by plaintiff, on the ground that his misconduct is
"weightier" than defendant's; (2) plaintiff's refusal of a manu-
facturer's safeguard proffered at no additional cost (perhaps a
category of misuse); and (3) unavoidably dangerous products
such as knives and moving machinery where no safeguards are
available under existing technology. The recognition of defenses,
of course, depends upon a court's view of where the loss reason-
ably should fall.
3. The Calabresi and Hirschoff Test for Strict Liability
Rejecting both the current reasonableness test, in which the
court or jury balances the cost of the accident against the manu-
facturer's cost of avoiding it, and the reciprocity theory, Calabresi
and Hirschoff propose a new test for strict products liability.1"'
Accepting a central aim of minimizing the sum of accident costs
and accident-avoidance costs, they suggest that risk should be
borne by the cheapest cost avoider, defined as the party who "is
in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between ac-
cident costs and accident avoidance costs and to act on that de-
cision once it is made."' 66 They reject a test which would place
the costs of all accidents deemed not worth having on the injured
party unless the injurer was negligent, or one which places such
costs on the injurer unless the injured was negligent.107 By avoid-
104 See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
165 Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yalo
LJ. 1055 (1972).
166 Id. at 1060 (emphasis omitted).
167 Accidents deemed not worth having are determined through a cost-bonefit
analysis.
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ing any inflexible rule of thumb which always places liability on
the same category of persons, and searching for the best cost
avoider in each particular case, Calabresi and Hirschoff hope
to both maximize primary-cost avoidance's and to minimize the
sum total of both accident costs and primary-accident-avoidance
costs. 6 9
Whether or not this hope is justified is open to a debate
which will not be pursued here because, in any event, the test
does not provide a satisfactory framework for the resolution of
strict-liability cases. Although theoretically appealing, the test is
impractical and inefficient because of the difficulties involved in
locating the best decisionmaker. Judges and juries are not trained
to draw multibranched decision trees. To compare the decision-
making abilities of a manufacturer at one point in time with those
of a consumer at another raises questions too complex and un-
certain of outcome for the real world of negotiation and trial
practice. The Calabresi and Hirschoff system would necessitate
more lawyer, judge and jury hours to settle or try each case. Its
extreme flexibility would make predictions of trial outcomes more
speculative than under existing tests of strict liability. Its adop-
tion therefore would result in more trials and fewer settlements.
4. Conclusions Regarding the Obviousness of a Danger in a
Strict-Liability-in-Tort Action
The Campo latent-defect doctrine has no place under any
theory of strict liability in tort. Under section 402A, obviousness
of the defect should be one factor in determining whether or not
the product is unreasonably dangerous. Obviousness minimizes
likelihood of harm. Thus, if foreseeable injuries probably will be
slight, and if the cost of avoiding the danger is high, it can be
concluded that a product is not unreasonably dangerous. Under
the new Greenman-Cronin test, by contrast, obviousness of the
danger has been held to be important only to affirmative defenses.
Regardless of the theory of strict liability applied, plaintiff's
mere inadvertence should never defeat recovery. Nor should his
misuse of the product where both the defect and plaintiff's mis-
conduct are found to be concurrent proximate causes of the in-
jury. Unreasonable assumption of the risk should be available as
a defense only if the plaintiff rejected an available and proffered
168 Primary-acddent-cost avoidance refers to the "reduction of the number
and severity of accidents!' See Calabresi, supra note 16, at 26. For a detailed dhs-
cussion of primary-accident-cost avoidance, see id. at 68-129.
169 See Calabresi & tHirschoff, supra note 169, at 1094-8S5.
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safeguard with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the
danger to which he was exposing himself.
If the reciprocity theory is adopted, manufacturers auto-
matically become liable to consumers. Obviousness should have
no effect on this liability, and no doctrinally logically defenses are
possible.
E. Strict Liability in Warranty
1. Establishing the Plaintiff's Cause of Action
In cases involving consumers injured by dangerous products,
the clear trend is toward the adoption of strict liability in tort as
the proper framework for analysis, 170 leaving the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to govern cases involving commercial usersP1 and
cases of economic loss to consumersY72 Some commentators, how-
ever, have questioned the advisability of bypassing the provisions
of the Code regarding privity, notice and disclaimers.1 71 More im-
portantly, some courts continue to apply the Code even in con-
sumer actions involving personal injury or property damage.114
Thus, considerations of the Code provisions still retain relevance
to these categories of cases.
The patency of the dangerous design has a significant effect
on the plaintiff's cause of action for breach of an implied war-
ranty under the Code. Obviousness of the defect may defeat re-
covery altogether by making the defect a nonproximate cause of
the injury. Section 2-314 sets forth the standard of merchantabil-
ity, stating in subsection (2) (c) that goods must be fit for the
ordinary purposes for which they are used. Comment 13 to this
section stresses that breach of warranty must be shown to be the
proximate cause of the loss sustained and concludes: "Action by
the buyer following an examination of the goods which ought to
170 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 97, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179
N.W.2d 64 (1970). See also Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64
Colum. L. Rev. 916, 936 (1964).
171 See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965). Once it is agreed that a distinction between consumers and commercial
users is appropriate, it may be difficult to determine into which category a par-
ticular plaintiff fits.
172 See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability jurisprudence, 66 Colum.
L. Rev. 917, 928-42 (1966).
173 See Dickerson, The ABC's of Products Liability-With a Close Look at
Section 402A and the Code, 36 Tenn. L. Rev. 439, 450-51 (1969); Rapson, Products
Liability Under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial
Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 692, 712-13 (1965).
174 See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 29 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d
207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
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have indicated the defect complained of can be shown as matter
bearing on whether the breach itself was a cause of the injury."
Comment 8 to section 2-316 (3) (b) states further that if the buyer
uses the goods after discovering the "defect," the resulting inju-
ries "may be found to result from his own action rather than
proximately from a breach of warranty." 175 This language indi-
cates that the use of an obviously dangerous product is only one
factor bearing on proximate cause.
However, later sections of article 2 take a less sympathetic
approach to obvious defects. Section 2-715(2) (b) allows conse-
quential damages for personal injuries proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty. But comment 5 to that section uncom-
promisingly declares that if the buyer did discover the defect prior
to his use of the product "the injury would not proximately result
from the breach of warranty." Since an obvious defect is, almost
by definition, one that will have been discovered, the harshness
of this comment should be apparent.
The significance of obvious defects in a Code action has not
been ignored by the judiciary. For example, Erdman v. Johnson
Brothers Radio & Television Co.176 involved a situation where a
latent defect became obvious due to malfunctioning. The Mary-
land Court of Appeals relied, in large part, upon the language in
comment 13 to section 2-314 and comment 5 to section 2-715
(2) (b) to defeat recovery in a warranty action. The plaintiffs
had continued to use their color television set despite the fact that
they had noticed its intermittent emission of smoke and sparks.
The court stated:
It would appear that an individual using a product when he had
actual knowledge of a defect or knowledge of facts which were so
obvious that he must have known of a defect, is either no longer
relying on the seller's express or implied warranty or has inter-jected an intervening cause of his own, and therefore a breach of
175 Section 2-316(3) (b) refers to special situations in which the circumstances
of a transaction are deemed to impose a duty on the buyer to discover defects.
[Wjhen the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the
goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to
examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects
which an examination ought in the circumstances have revealed to
him....
Comment 8 to section 2-316(3) (b) implies that any buyer who continues to use a
product after discovering a defect may be barred from a recovery, even though
the circumstances did not impose a general duty to examine. Thus, obvious defects
may defeat the implication of a warranty before one reaches the issue of proximate
cause.
176 260 Md. 190, 271 A.2d 744 (1970).
177 See id. at 197-203, 271 A.2d at 748-51.
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such warranty cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of the
ensuing injury .... 178
The main thrust of Erdman is that even if an implied warranty
has been breached, the breach cannot be the proximate cause of
the injuries where the defect is obvious.
The notion that plaintiff's use of an obviously dangerous
product precludes the breach of warranty from being the proxi-
mate cause of injuries is an example of the frequent confusion
of proximate cause and contributory negligence.170 If the breach
of warranty is a significant factor in causing plaintiff's injury,
there is proximate cause. If the plaintiff's conduct is also a sig-
nificant cause of his injuries, he may be denied recovery on
the ground of contributory negligence. Rather than confusing
its legal theories, the Code should have provided directly for a
contributory negligence defense. Moreover, since the burden of
proving causation is on the plaintiff and the burden of proving
contributory negligence is usually on the defendant, the Code
approach is unfairly weighted against the plaintiff.
2. Affirmative Defenses to Strict Liability in Warranty
Even if the plaintiff injured by an obviously defective prod.
uct can establish a breach of warranty and clear the proximate-
cause hurdle, it still remains uncertain whether or not he will re-
cover. For it is unclear to what extent contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk are available to defeat his recovery.180
The Code does not define either defense nor does it state whether
either may be used.' In light of these omissions it is not surprising
that the cases differ as to whether or not contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk are available as defenses to warranty
actions.182
The New York Court of Appeals seems clearly committed
to contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability through
warranty. In the recent case of Codling v. Paglia,18 the court
held, without discussing the language of the Code, that under
strict liability in warranty a defect's being discoverable by rea-
sonable exercise of due care precludes plaintiff's recovery.184 The
court did not clearly state whether latency must be alleged and
178 Id. at 196-97, 271 A.2d at 747.
179 See Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 417; Green, Contributory Negllgenco
and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rev. 3, 11 (1927).
180 1 R. Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 542 (2d ed. 1970).
181 Id. at 544, 946.
182 Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 501, 503 (1965).
183 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
184 Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
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proved by plaintiff or whether it is a defensive matter. However,
the choice of language indicates that the court considered latency
as bearing on the defense of contributory negligence. Since the
only strict-liability recovery in New York is grounded in war-
ranty,8 5 Codling means that no New York plaintiff can recover
if injured by an obviously dangerous product.
Because the rubric of strict liability in tort seems destined
to replace strict liability in warranty, a detailed analysis of war-
ranty cases is outside the scope of this article. A few general ob-
servations, however, should be made. Many of the courts which
avoid adopting negligence terminology because of its dissimilarity
to warranty law achieve the same result through the proximate-
cause notions previously discussed, or by declaring that a buyer
who uses an article he knows to be defective is no longer relying
on the warranty.188
As in strict liability in tort, a category of conduct which fre-
quently bars plaintiff's recovery is unreasonable exposure to a
known and appreciated risk.'87 In warranty cases, rather than la-
beling this assumption of risk, courts frequently talk in terms of
the plaintiff's duty to mitigate or avoid damagesY38 Professor Le-
vine suggests that the buyer's contributory fault can be utilized
in determining the measure of damages, rather than allowing it to
affect the manufacturer's liability'8 9 This approach was taken,
in fact, in one case, Chapinan v. Brown.10° Although more cum-
bersome procedurally than allocating the entire loss to one party,
such a comparative distribution of damages seems fairer.
3. Conclusions Regarding Strict Liability in Warranty
Since the Uniform Commercial Code is primarily designed
to deal with transactions between equally knowledgeable business-
men, it is an awkward vehicle to resolve products-liability ques-
tions involving personal injuries or property damage to noncom-
mercial consumers. The Code's cost-avoidance analysis is really
better suited to achieve justice between commercial parties, espe-
cially where only economic loss is involved.10' Tort principles
which seek to compensate the injured by placing liability on the
185 See, e.g., Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d
207, 30 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).
186 Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d S01, 50 (1965).
187 See Levine, Buyer's Conduct as Affecting the Extent of Manufacturer's
Liability in Warranty, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 627, 638-39 (1968).
188 Id. at 640.
189 Id. at 643-44.
190 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962).
191 See note 38 supra.
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risk creator will result in a fairer and more certain distribution of
consumer losses.
The creator of a nonreciprocal risk can fairly be held ac-
countable to the injured consumer regardless of whether the lat-
ter could have avoided the harm. This principle is valid even in
the unusual case where the manufacturer sells directly to the
consumer. The fact that the context is one of a so-called "bargain-
ing relationship" does not preclude the application of the theory
of reciprocity. The citadel of privity as a prerequisite for recovery
against the manufacturer has indeed fallen, 02 but the absence of
privity should not be deemed necessary to justify the use of tort
principles. In fact, in negligence law, the closer the relationship
between the parties, the easier it is to find duty to the plaintiff.
The tort theory of reciprocity fits like a glove any situation
where one party wields a unique power to impose risks of physi-
cal harm on the other. The consumer who orders directly from
the manufacturer seldom has much, if any, power to bargain for
a safer product. Even if he did, he usually would have insufficient
knowledge of the product's dangers to alert him to the necessity
for such bargaining. Therefore, the consumer who buys directly
from the manufacturer, and who suffers personal injury or prop-
erty damage, should be treated under tort principles in the same
manner as any other customer.9 3
Strict products liability is a relatively new thing under the
sun, thus far not fitting with complete comfort into any preexist-
ing contract or tort setting. But it seems at least less uncomfort-
192 Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 791 (1966) [herelnafter
Prosser, Citadel].
193 Where only economic losses are incurred by the consumer, whether he is the
direct purchaser from the manufacturer or a subpurchaser, only rights and remedles
contained in the Uniform Commercial Code should apply. See Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). See also Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 402A, which limits strict liability in tort to situations
involving physical harm. But see Santor v. A & M Karagheuslan, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
207 A.2d 305 (1965).
As Prosser states, "[1Moss on the bargain must depend on what the bargain
is." Prosser, Citadel, supra note 192, at 823. The Code is specifically designed to
aid in ascertaining the parameters of a contract. It should be noted that limiting a
consumer who suffers only economic harm to Code remedies can be consldercd
compatible with reciprocity theory. The buying and selling of goods for economic
benefit can be deemed one category of conduct in which each party suffers only
the reciprocal risk that the deal will not meet his economic expectations. A non-
reciprocal risk perhaps still could be found if the dealing was so unfair that an
inordinate degree of risk was imposed on one party. However, this Interpretation
should be rejected because it taints reciprocity analysis with the paradigm of
reasonableness. To avoid this taint and to take advantage of a statute tailored to
the evaluation of such claims, actions seeking recovery for economic loss should
be under the sole jurisdiction of the Code.
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able as a tort theory. Therefore, it is hoped that states such as
New York will abandon warranty principles and give serious con-
sideration to the tort theory of reciprocity as the most appropriate
theoretical framework for the doctrine.
IV
CATEGORIES OF INJURED PARTIES
Little mention has been made so far of the different catego-
ries of persons who may be harmed by an obviously dangerous
product. Is there any reason to differentiate among and between:
(1) purchaser-users and mere users, (2) employees and other
users, (3) children and adults or (4) bystanders and users?
If the paradigm of reciprocity is used to make the initial li-
ability decision, the plaintiff's category normally would make no
difference. For in almost every case, the manufacturer of an ob-
viously dangerous product would have created a nonreciprocal
risk of harm to the injured party. Therefore, in the discussion
that follows, the focus will be on the use of the reasonableness
paradigm in establishing negligent design, or in proving that a
product is unreasonably dangerous under Section 402A of the Re-
statement. We will also consider strict liability in warranty. In
addition, some attention will be given to affirmative defenses,
which generally are utilitarian justifications for shifting the risk
of loss from the manufacturer back to the plaintiff.
A. When the Injuries Are Suffered by the Product's User
1. Purchaser-Users Versus Mere Users
Under the reasonableness rubric, purchasers and users should
be treated identically despite the fact that mere users do not have
an initial choice in the selection of the product. If the obvious
danger was avoidable by using safeguards or better material, the
question becomes one of balancing the likelihood and seriousness
of the harm against the cost of avoiding it. The fact that an ob-
vious danger is as likely to be avoided by a mere user as by a
purchaser-user indicates that these two classes should be treated
alike. Conceivably, the difference between purchaser-users and
mere users might be relevant to the defenses asserted by the manu-
facturer.
2. Employee-Users
The nonvoluntary character of an employee's "choice" to
encounter a dangerous situation raises serious questions as to
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whether or not he can really be said to have assumed the risk
of his injury or to have been contributorily negligent. Noel notes
that an employee's consent to work under dangerous conditions,
when given because of economic pressure, does not preclude a
suit against the employer. Analogizing from this, Noel suggests
that "the workman injured because of... [an] unsafe design is
subject to comparable economic pressure and ... his consent to
use the dangerous machine, perhaps in order to retain his job, is
likewise not free and voluntary." 1 4
This latter principle has been recognized in a case where an
employee was injured when her hand and arm slipped into an
unguarded machine.195 It has also been recognized in a Washing-
ton Supreme Court case where a workman lost three fingers when
his hand slipped on a centralizer which had no protective fea-
tures.109 The court held that the patency of the danger, rather
than automatically relieving the manufacturer from liability,
would do so only in the event that the plaintiff voluntarily and
unreasonably encountered it. The court concluded that "[i]t
could never be said as a matter of law that a workman whose
job requires him to expose himself to a danger, voluntarily and
unreasonably encounters the same. 1 7
It should be pointed out that not all courts take this liberal
view. In Fore v. Vermeer Manufacturing Co.,198 an employee had
actual knowledge that a trencher's brakes were defective, but con-
tinued to operate it anyway. The court, in holding that the em-
ployee had assumed the risk as a matter of law, concluded that
fear of losing one's job was not evidence of legal constraint which
rendered the employee's conduct involuntary.199
In cases involving ordinary contributory negligence it has
been observed that an employee working under dangerous condi-
tions may, because of the demanding nature of the particular job,
be unable to exercise adequate care for his own safety2 0  The
same principle was recognized in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co.,201
where the court quoted the following language with approval:
194 Noel, Defective Products, supra note 90, at 127 (footnote omitted).
195 Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
1906 Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 20 (1969).
197 Id. at 836, 454 P.2d at 208.
198 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (1972).
199 Id. at 349, 287 N.E.2d at 528. This case probably should be classified as
one of misuse because the plaintiff did have an opportunity to render the machine
safe before using it and consciously chose not to do so.
200 See Gyerman v. United States Lines Co., 7 Cal. 3d 488, 501, 498 P.2d
1043, 1051, 102 Cal. Rptr. 799, 803 (1972).
201 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
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"[w]here a person must work in a place of possible danger the
amount of care he is bound to exercise for his own safety may well
be less by reason of the necessity of his giving attention to his work
than would otherwise be the case.)202
3. Children-Users
Children as a class of plaintiffs require special consideration.
Recognizing this fact in Hood v. Formatron Corp.,2 0 3 the Okla-
homa Supreme Court held as error an instruction on the issue of
negligent design which indicated the necessity of proving a latent
defect where the plaintiff was a two-year-old child. 2 4 Most cases,
however, deny recovery to the injured child either on the ground
of the patency of the defect to the parent605 or because the par-
ent's failure to protect his child from the obvious danger is found
to be an unforeseeable intervening cause.2 0
Consideration of the actual circumstances of these cases sug-
gests that children form a class of plaintiffs to whom the obvious-
ness of the danger is irrelevant. Since it is quite foreseeable that
a parent may fail to protect a child from an obviously dangerous
product, the parent's conduct should not be considered a super-
seding cause barring recovery.
B. The Injured Bystander
Injured bystanders were once unprotected by the law, but alljurisdictions now recognize a cause of action in their favor for in-juries caused by negligent conduct.207 Thus, once negligent design
is established, recovery is usually allowed. In jurisdictions adopt-
ing strict liability in tort, the clear trend is in a similar direction
and bystanders are usually protected 0 8 In fact, it was reported
in 1971 that only one jurisdiction which had adopted the doctrine
of strict liability in tort had rejected the general principle of by-
202 Id. at 473, 467 P.2d at 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 634-36, quoting Vams v.
Barco Mg. Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 246, 263, 22 Cal. Rptr. 737, 747 (1962), quoting
Johnson v. Nicholson, 159 Cal. App. 2d 395, 410, 324 P.2d 307, 316 (198).
203 488 P.2d 1281 (Okla. 1971).
204 Id. at 1283. See also Phillips, Products Liability for Personal Injury to
M mors, 56 Va. L. Rev. 1223, 1225 (1970).
205 See, e.g., Poppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 389, 190 S.Ed 815 (1972),
where the court applied the latent-defect requirement to defeat recovery by a
12-year-old child injured while riding at dusk on a bicycle which had no light or
reflectors. The court emphasized that the absence of safety devices "was obvious
and in fact actually observed by the parents-purchasers." Id. at 388, 190 S.E.2d
at 817.
206 See Phillips, supra note 204, at 1226-35.
207 Prosser, Torts, supra note 11, at 622.
208 See, eg., Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1970); Howes v. Hansen,
56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
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stander recovery. 20 The Uniform Commercial Code, by contrast,
is generally more restrictive. Liability of sellers under express or
implied warranties is limited in most jurisdictions to the buyer
and his family, household and guests.2 10 But the Code does con-
tain more liberal alternatives which allow bystander recovery,211
and many courts have judicially expanded the classes of protected
persons.2 2
One would think that the latent-defect rule would have no
effect on bystander recovery. Its rationale would seem to be in-
compatible with most bystander cases, because the innocent third
party rarely has a chance to see the danger and avoid it. Never-
theless, jurisdictions which hold that obviousness precludes manu-
facturer liability have extended the rule to defeat recovery by by-
standers.
In Stovall & Co. v. Tate,213 a student sitting in her classroom
lost most of the vision in one eye when struck by a rock thrown
from a lawnmower being operated in the school yard. In her suit
against the manufacturer, the plaintiff alleged negligent design,
breach of implied warranty and strict liability in arguing that the
lawnmower should have been equipped with a deflecting device.
The court held that strict liability should be adopted only through
legislative action, and that because the danger was obvious, the
defendant manufacturer was entitled to summary judgment on
the negligence count; the warranty counts were dismissed for
lack of privity.21 4 The court stressed that the user knew of the
danger.215 This indicates an unarticulated rationale: that as be-
tween a user aware of an obvious danger and the manufacturer,
the user is the best cost avoider. This reasoning defeats an im-
portant economic consideration, cost spreading; and in the event
the user is judgment proof, it denies justice to a totally innocent
plaintiff.
In jurisdictions which do not follow the latent-defect rule,
209 Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common
Law Determinism, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 635 (1971) [hereinafter Note, The
Bystander].
210 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, alt. A; see Note, The Bystander,
supra note 209, at 628.
211 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-318, alts. B, C; see Note, The Bystander,
supra note 209, at 631 n34.
212 See, e.g., Toombs v. Fort Pierce Gas Co., 203 So. 2d 615 (Fie. 1968). In
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973), tho
New York Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of strict liability In warranty to
a bystander. Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
213 124 Ga. App. 605, 184 S.E.2d 834 (1971).
214 See id. at 614-15, 184 S.E.2d at 840.
215 See id. at 614, 184 S.E.2d at 840.
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the courts have shown more interest in the plight of the bystander.
The clear trend is to say that as to bystanders there is always
initial manufacturer liability for manufacturing and selling a de-
fective product, although assumption of the risk by the bystander
has not yet been ruled out as a defense. For example, in Pike v.
Frank G. Hough Co.,10 the plaintiff bystander had been injured
when hit by a bulldozer. The court noted that "it is not necessarily
apparent to bystanders that the machine operator is incapable of
observing them though they are 30 to 40 feet behind the vehide
and in its direct path. '2  The court also quoted with approval
language from Harper and James indicating that even if courts
are unwilling to protect those who buy obviously dangerous prod-
ucts, negligence law requires that others be protected.218
The Pike court did say, however, that obviousness is relevant
to affirmative defenses. 1 9 With respect to unreasonable assump-
tion of the risk, this makes sense. There is no reason to treat by-
standers differently from users, provided that the manufacturer
proves that the injured bystander did, in fact, know of, appreciate
and unreasonably assume the risk.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted the Pike approach toward by-
standers. In Wirth v. Clark Equipment Co., 0 a bystander was
run over by the wheel of a carrier which had been custom-built
to the purchaser's specifications. The defect alleged was a design
which prevented the operator from seeing the ground in front of
the right wheel for a distance of 51 feet, nine inches. In addition,
the carrier had no wheel guards, mirrors or other such safeguards.
The trial court refused to submit the issue of strict liability to the
jury, finding that the machine was custom-built and could not
contain any concealed defects. The Ninth Circuit reversed, citing
Pike and holding that even if the machine were considered custom-
built, there was no evidence that the defect was obvious to the
plaintiff bystander 22'
The Eighth Circuit has also followed the Pike approach. In
Passwaters v. General Motors Corp.,"" a motorcycle passenger
was injured when her leg came into contact with the metal flanges
protruding from the wheel cover of a passing automobile designed
by the defendant. In the trial court, the plaintiff lost by directed
216 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
217 Id. at 473, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 634 (emphasis in original).
218 Id. at 474, 467 P.2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
219 Id. at 473, 467 P.2d at 234, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
220 457 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 US. 876 (1972).
221 Id. at 1267.
222 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972).
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verdict on both negligent-design and strict-liability theories."'
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that protection is extended
to bystanders under both doctrines. 24 It also quoted with ap-
proval language from Elmore v. American Motors Corp. 2" indi-
cating that bystanders are entitled to even more protection than
consumers and users.22 6
It is hard to understand why some courts have been reluc-
tant to allow bystander recovery from the manufacturer where
the defect is obvious. In theory, recovery is consistent with a num-
ber of traditional tort policies. For one, bystander recovery facil-
itates loss spreading, a reason that has been offered to justify the
ease with which such recovery has been allowed in strict-liability
cases. Clearly, the bystander is no better able to distribute the
loss of his injuries than is the injured user.22 7 Moreover, it is ob-
vious that the manufacturer is clearly better suited to compare
costs of avoidance with costs of compensation and act on that
decision. 8 Even those who believe that fault is necessary before
purchasers and users can recover agree that bystanders should
be protected by strict liability because it is impossible for them
to bargain collectively for safer products 2 And finally, to
achieve a fair distribution of loss under the reciprocity theory,
bystander recovery from the manufacturer who created the obvi-
ous, nonreciprocal risk is essential.
V
CONCLUSION
Our examination of the cases dealing with obviously danger-
ous products has revealed what I consider to be an unfortunate
tendency. Overly protective of manufacturers, many courts have
allowed obviousness of a defect to bar a plaintiff's recovery in a
variety of ways.
The most unacceptable of these is the Campo doctrine which
makes the allegation and proof of latency a material element of
the plaintiff's cause of action. Although the doctrine arose in a
negligent-design action, in some jurisdictions it has spread into
strict liability in tort. Also, in those jurisdictions which continue
223 Id. at 1272.
224 Id. at 1274-78.
225 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969).
226 454 F.2d at 1278-79, quoting 70 Cal. 2d at 586, 451 P.2d at 88-89, 75 Cal.
Rptr. at 656-57.
227 See Note, The Bystander, supra note 209, at 637-38.
228 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 165, at 1262-63.
229 See Note, The Bystander, supra note 209, at 642.
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to couch strict liability in a warranty framework, the obviousness
of a danger generally precludes recovery as a matter of law.
Courts reach this result by holding either that obviousness pre-
vents the implication of a warranty, or that it compels a finding
that the defect was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
The rationale for denial of recovery in this group of cases is un-
clear because Campo and most of its progeny merely pronounce
in conclusory fashion the principle that a manufacturer never
should be liable for harm resulting from an obviously dangerous
product.
A second approach courts have taken is to consider obvious-
ness as one factor in assessing the reasonableness of the manu-
facturer's conduct, whether in a negligent-design action or a strict-
liability count under Section 402A of the Restatement. A third
and distinctly minority view is that obviousness is relevant only
to affirmative defenses. In these courts, obviousness often leads to
a finding of unreasonable assumption of the risk and infrequently
to a finding of ordinary contributory negligence. In New Jersey,
however, the Bexiga doctrine can be invoked to bar consideration
of these affirmative defenses where justice requires, and its spread
to other jurisdictions seems likely.
I think compensation for harm should be considered the ba-
sic purpose of strict liability in tort and perhaps of all tort law.
To rid strict liability of all remnants of negligence will require
the adoption of a radically different doctrinal framework. A sat-
isfactory one is found in the paradigm of reciprocity which fo-
cuses primarily on fairness to individuals rather than on social
considerations such as loss spreading and cost avoidanceY0 This
paradigm imposes liability on the creator of a nonreciprocal risk.
Since a consumer is never engaged in the activity of manufactur-
ing and marketing dangerous, although perhaps socially useful,
items, he can never be a reciprocal-risk creator with the manu-
facturer. Thus, if the reciprocity theory is kept in its pure form
the consumer of an obviously dangerous product always will be
entitled to recover. The manufacturer will have no excuse since
the traditional reciprocity excuses of compulsion and of unavoid-
able ignorance will never be applicable in this type of case.
Any temptation to engraft reasonableness exceptions onto
230 Of course, the paradigm of reciprocity, by sharply increasing the number
of manufacturers held liable for products injuries, also will maximize loss spreading
as well as achieving the goal of fairness. Although cost avoidance theoretically could
be maximized by the use of Calabresi and HirschoWs "cheapest-cost-avodee test,
that test is impractical; and I would argue that fairness is a more important goal.
See text accompanying notes 165-69 supra.
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the paradigm of reciprocity should be resisted. Such exceptions
would be doctrinally inconsistent with the basic theory and would
reintroduce the old negligence calculus. Fears should not be raised
by the fact that the pure reciprocity theory amounts almost to
absolute liability for products manufacturers. Through the prox-
imate-cause rubric they will receive adequate protection from
unfair liability.
In conclusion, the limited scope of this article should be em-
phasized. It has dealt entirely with a discussion of the consumer-
manufacturer relationship. The hard question of whether the the-
ory of reciprocity requires liability of the "innocent" retailer to
the consumer injured by a product is left for future consideration.
The question of whether absolute manufacturer liability and vol-
untary liability insurance will create a completely satisfactory
compensation scheme for those injured by products has not been
discussed in detail; nor have alternative compensation schemes
such as compulsory no-fault insurance. Some commentators have
argued that complete social insurance offers the only adequate
solution for compensating the large number of persons injured in
our highly industrialized society 1s This probably is true, but it
seems unlikely that we will be ready to accept such a comprehen-
sive scheme in the near future. Meanwhile, if tort liability finds
its base in the pure reciprocity theory outlined here, a relatively
effective compensation scheme will have been achieved for those
injured by products regardless of whether the danger is latent or
patent.
231 See Ehrenzweig, supra note 18, at 247; Franklin, Replacing the Negligenco
Lottery: Compensation and Selective Reimbursement, 93 Va. L. Rev. 774, 812
(1967).
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